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This is a study of the sex-discrimination aspects 
of child custody and child support law in the state of 
Oklahoma. Historical development, trends in literature, 
and equal protection analysis by the United States 
Supreme Court are examined prior to undertaking an 
analysis of Oklahoma statutory and case law on child 
custody and the support obligation. A tier one-and-a-
half analysis is then employed to evaluate Oklahoma law 
from a constitutional perspective. 
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The laws in the United States concerning child 
custody and the support obligation vary greatly from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. What is common policy in 
one state may be seen as a novel innovation in another. 
The result of this phenomenon is a patchwork of legal 
rules which often work a discriminatory hardship on one 
of the parents whose marriage has ended in divorce. 
While obviously the children in such situations suffer 
substantial hardship by the loss of continuous contact 
with one parent and possible financial disadvantages as 
well, the parents also suffer hardships. Not the least 
of these is the physical and emotional separation from 
their children--at least in the case of the non-custodial 
parent. The courts for a long period in American law 
have attempted to protect the interests of the child 
under various verbal formulations, but the substantial 
loss suffered by the parent has all but escaped judicial 
attention. This thesis will examine the law of the state 
of Oklahoma with regard to two aspects of divorce--the 
custody decision and the support obligation. The 
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focus of the study of Oklahoma law will be divided into 
two areas of analysis, one constitutional and the other 
a policy orientation. Ultimately, the two will be com-
bined into suggestions for reform in the Oklahoma treat-
ment of child custody and the obligation to support the 
children of a marriage which has ended in divorce. 
The first major undertaking of the thesis will be 
an examination of the history and literature surrounding 
child custody and support. English common-law origins 
and the early approaches of the states will provide an 
historical basis from which to begin. A review of the 
literature on the development of child custody and sup-
port law will be undertaken to analyze the options open 
to courts in making these crucial decisions. This liter-
ature review also will provide a basis for noting the 
trends which have developed in recent years in a number 
of American jurisdictions as well as for an analysis of 
the views of the leading commentators on the subject. 
Following the review of the literature and history 
surrounding child custody and support law in the United 
States, attention will be directed toward constitutional 
analysis of gender-based classifications which appear 
almost to be inherent in the approaches of many courts. 
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court from 
Reed v. Reed, 404 u.s. 71 (1971), to Michael M. v. Superior 
Court of Sonoma County, 101 s.ct. 1200 (1981), will be 
examined to provide the basis for an equal protection 
test to be applied in the protection of parental rights 
in child custody and support cases. 
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The equal protection analysis thus developed will 
then be applied to Oklahoma law to determine whether the 
statutory provisions and judicial decisions of the state 
appellate courts are consistent with the doctrine which 
has emerged over the last decade in the decisions of the 
nation's highest court. Similarly, the policy develop-
ments in other jurisdictions which were presented in the 
literature review will be used as a measuring stick by 
which to test Oklahoma's receptiveness to change in this 
area of the law. 
In studying the Oklahoma law, three hypotheses will 
be examined. First, it is hypothesized that Oklahoma 
will not have been in the lead among states in terms of 
adopting alternatives to the traditional sole maternal 
custody award. Second, it is hypothesized that Oklahoma 
appellate courts will be reluctant to intervene to over-
turn custody and support obligation decisions rendered 
by the judges of the state's trial courts. Third, it is 
hypothesized that the Oklahoma appellate courts will have 
been reluctant to strike out on their own to apply Four-
teenth Amendment equal protection analysis as a means of 
removing inequities in the state's law concerning child 
custody and financial support obligations. 
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The study of public law has been one of the central 
aspects of political science since its beginnings as an 
academic discipline. While political science has moved 
far beyond the mere reading of constitutions and court 
decisions in its study of government, politics, political 
behavior, and policy it remains true that the study of 
the interpretation of the United States Constitution and 
its application to the states is an integral part of the 
discipline. As this thesis progresses, it will become 
clear that the uold" approach to the study of politics 
from a constitutional perspective merges with one of the 
"newest" aspects of political science in terms of policy 
choices. The courts of Oklahoma, like the United States 
Supreme Court, fashion public policy through their 
decisions in a way that is equally important to that of 
the legislature's adoption of statutory guides on the 
questions of child custody and support. 
The methodology employed in gathering the data on 
which this thesis is based is a traditional public law 
approach. The statutory law of Oklahoma was examined, 
followed by an analysis of the Oklahoma appellate court 
decisions on the topics of child custody and support with 
particular attention being given to those more recent 
cases in which specific Fourteenth Amendment issues were 
raised and resolved at the state court level. Similar 
analysis was given to the decisions of the United States 
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Supreme Court, this time with special emphasis given to 
those cases which have involved gender-based classifi-
cations subjected to equal protection challenges under 
the Fourteenth Amendment or due process challenges under 
the Fifth Amendment. 
In the portions of this study dealing with the case 
law on the topic, extensive quotations have been employed. 
Rather than attempting to provide a capsule summary of 
the most important cases, the choice has been made to 
provide the key passages of the opinions themselves. 
The words of the courts are the law on the topic, and 
given the American legal system's reliance on judicial 
precedent it is preferable to state the law precisely 
rather than risking error by oversimplification of the 
reasoning of the justices. 
Finally, the thesis will suggest reforms which might 
be adopted in Oklahoma child custody and support law. 
With the increasing attention to policy matters in the 
field of political science, it is becoming more apparent 
that such suggestions are a vital part of the discipline. 
If academic endeavors are to have value beyond the study 
of a topic as it existed yesterday or as it exists today, 
there is an obligation on the part of those who write 
to propose solutions to the problems they identify in 
governmental decisions, whether found in the courts or 
elsewhere in the governmental process. 
CHAPTER II 
HISTORY OF THE LAW AND SURVEY 
OF THE LITERATURE 
A. Introduction 
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The award of child custody and the support obli-
gation in divorce and parental separation cases has been 
one of the more difficult aspects of the legal problems 
surrounding the dissolution of marriage. Historically 
the pendulum has swung between extremes of favoring one 
parent or the other in the matter of custody, and today 
appears to be moving nearer a center position. In the 
matter of support obligation, however, the responsibility 
always has been imposed on the father (so long as both 
parents are still living) . Presently there is sub-
stantial variation among the state jurisdictions in the 
awarding of child custody and the imposition of the 
support obligation, as one would anticipate in our 
federal system in which each state is free to fashion 
its own statutes and judicial remedies so long as they 
are consistent with the United States Constitution. This 
chapter will examine the major trends in development of 
the law of child custody and support obligation and 
7 
examine the scholarly literature on the topic as a 
prelude to specific consideration of Oklahoma statutory 
and case law on the topic which will be undertaken in 
Chapter III. 
B. Legal Tradition in Child 
Custody Awards 
As long ago as in Old Testament biblical history, 
disputes have arisen over the custody of a child between 
two or more parties. King Solomon demonstrated his 
legendary wisdom in deciding a custody dispute between 
two women each claiming to be the mother of a child. He 
proposed to divide the child in half with his sword and 
thereby give each woman half of the child. Upon hearing 
his proposed solution, one of the women relinquished her 
claim to the other in order to spare the child's life. 
Solomon then awarded the child to the woman who was 
willing to give up her claim to allow the child to live, 
proclaiming that only the true mother would act in this 
manner. 
Then the king said, "The one says, 'This is 
my son who is living, and your son is the 
dead one'; and the other says, 'No! For your 
son is the dead one, and my son·· is the living 
one.'" And the king said, "Get me a sword." 
So they brought a sword before the king. And 
the king said, "Divide the living child in two, 
and give half to the one and half to the other." 
Then the woman whose child was the living spoke 
to the king, for she was deeply stirred over 
her son, and said, "Oh, my lord, give her the 
living child, and by no means kill him." 
But the other said, "He shall be neither 
mine nor yours; divide him." Then the 
king answered and said, "Give the first 
woman the living child, and by no means 
kill him. She is his mother. When all 
Israel heard of the judgment which the 
king had handed down, they feared the 
king: for they saw that the wisdom of God 
was in him to administer justice.l 
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As between parents, the right to custody and control 
over the child were first to be recognized by the English 
common law, and the courts had little difficulty in 
determining which parent was entitled to the child. The 
sex of the parent was the sole criterion. The English 
tradition was that the father was the natural guardian 
of the children and it was he who controlled both their 
educational and religious training. He had primary right 
to his children's services and, in return, he was liable 
for their support and maintenance. According to the 
common law, the rights of and to the children were seen 
as property rights. As married women had no property 
rights, the children automatically were the chattel of 
the father, even as the wife also was the chattel of the 
husband. As Blackstone stated the common law rule, 
. . . the father had a natural right to the 
custody of his children, while the mother was 
not entitled to have any power over them; she 
was entitled only to their reverence and 
respect.2 
The rights of the father over and to his children went 
9 
to the extreme to granting him custody of the child even 
while the child was nursing at the mother's breast. 
The right of the father was absolute unless he somehow 
had abused his right. 3 
American courts followed suit with their English 
counterparts and awarded sole custody of the child to the 
father until the time of the industrial revolution. With 
the consequent movement of men out of the home to the 
factories, offices, and other centers of daytime business 
activity, mothers gradually became recognized as the 
nurturers of children and as the parent primarily con-
cerned with the caretaking responsibilities. This change 
in the law was primarily the result of judicial recog-
nition of sociological changes which were taking place 
in family structure and duties as a consequence of the 
industrial revolution. 
The English Parliament was the first to statutorily 
modify the absolute right of the father to custody of his 
children. Justice Talford's Act in 1839 provided for 
custody to be awarded to the mother if the child was 
less than seven years old. 
4 Hence the "tender years 
doctrine, " as it came to be known, placed a presumption 
in favor of the mother when there was a dispute between 
parents regarding child custody. The doctrine was based 
on the presumption that maternal custody was in the best 
interests of the child. 5 
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In the United States, the common law rule of 
paternal preference appeared to fade with the coming of 
the twentieth century in light of specific state statutes 
providing that no preference be given to either parent 
in the custody dispute--assuming that both parents were 
found to be "fit" parents. 6 However, the twentieth 
century also brought to the United States a new legal 
presumption clearly expressing that preference-should-be 
given to the mother in a custody battle, especially if 
the child were young. (The courts rarely were clear as 
to what age was deemed sufficiently young to invoke this 
7 preference, however.) This new point of law stemmed 
from case law rather than from black letter (statutory) 
law. While statutory language put the mother and father 
on equal footing, the judiciary in effect reversed the 
preference from the common-law paternal preference to 
a preference for the mother in awards of custody and-
despite legislative intent the tender years doctrine 
quickly became embedded in marital law. The judiciary 
typically held that it was in the child's best interest 
not to be separated from its mother unless she was shown 
to be an "unfit" parent. Accordingly, the phrases 
"the best interests of the child" and "parental fitness" 
became the cornerstone of the maternal preference or 
tender years doctrine. 
While sole custody awarded to the mother has been 
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and is currently the norm, there are other alternatives 
available to the courts in custody proceedings. Sole 
paternal custody could be awarded or agreed to between 
the parties. The court may also award divided custody 
(also called "alternating" or "split" custody) where 
each parent has sole custody over the child for part of 
the year--usually that time the child resides with that 
adult. Current literature can be confusing in that 
the terms 11 divided," "split," and 11 alternative, 11 when 
denoting the type of custody, often refer only to 
physical custody, rather than to legal custody. Juris-
dictions need clarity in their terms, and for purposes 
of this thesis, 11 divided custody 11 will serve only as the 
term for "alternating 11 or "split 11 custody and will 
denote divided physical and legal custody. Under this 
system, custody occurs at different times with regard to 
each parent. In other words, legal custody is not held 
jointly under a divided custody arrangement. 
The final alternative available to the courts is 
joint custody. Under a joint custody arrangement, 
parents share legal responsibility for all important 
decisions related to the upbringing of the child, as well 
as some degree of shared physical custody. It is this 
aspect of shared legal custody which differentiates 
joint custody from divided custody (in which legal 
custody alternates between the parents). A joint custody 
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arrangement insures that neither parent will take any 
major action with regard to the child and its upbringing 
without first informing and consulting the other parent. 
C. Survey of the Literature 
Divorce in the United States has become so prevalent 
that child custody issues today directly affect one in 
every six children. One million children a year 
experience their parents' divorce. 8 Upon the dissolution 
of the marriage, some parents are able to come to an 
amicable agreement regarding custody. More often, 
however, divorcing parents cannot come to a decision as 
to the parent to whom the care of the child will be 
entrusted and as to which parent will make the important 
as well as the unimportant decisions regarding care, 
health, and education of the child. In this latter case, 
the unpleasant task of deciding between two parents 
traditionally falls to the trial court. American courts 
have wide discretion under the doctrine of parens patriae 
to intervene in a family relationship and protect the 
welfare of the child. Most state statutes reflect· broad 
parens patriae power which includes jurisdiction, custody, 
support and maintenance, visitation, decree modification, 
and legitimacy. 
[T]he principle of the controlling power of 
the state as parens patriae , look[s] 
to the defense of those who are unable to 
defend themselves, and to the interest which 
society has in the proper care and training 
of children upon whom it is to depend for 
its future existence.9 
It is at the discretion of the judge to assume the 
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responsibility for choosing with which parent the child 
can develop without suffering unnecessarily due 
to the divorce. The wrong decision by the court can 
have a devastating effect on the child's future. This 
decision is even more difficult because "a decree of 
divorce with its custody provisions cannot contrive a 
satisfactory substitute for a happy parental home," and 
"there are no reliable, empirical studies that can be 
used to predict the consequences of an adult's assumed 
future behavior upon a child." 10 
C.l. Tend~r Years 
In order to make decisions regarding custody, the 
judiciary in the early twentieth century turned to social 
sciences of the day and the consensus of American culture. 
The result of this search gave us the maternal preference 
or the tender years doctrine. In this period, there was 
a definite change in the structure of family relations 
as a result of the industrial revolution. This change 
was a determining factor in the courts' decisions. The 
primary role of the father in the family came to be that 
of the provider, and this role took him out of the house 
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and into the factory or office for a majority of the day. 
The mother at this time rarely worked outside of the 
home and therefore became the parent more responsible 
for child care duties. The literature indicates that 
the "best interest of the child" grew to a position of 
primary importance during this period as the standard by 
which the courts would determine custody, and most often 
the court granted·the mother sole custody of the child 
on the theory that she would provide full-time nurturing. 
The mother was assumed the more natural parent, and the 
courts took the position that the child's future health, 
welfare, and happiness depended on its relationship with 
the mother. From this judicial perspective, the "best 
interest" of the child was synonymous with being in the 
custody of its mother, even though the courts seldom 
expressed the doctrine in such a clear statement. 11 
The literature also notes that courts recognized 
that there is an obvious biological link between a 
mother and child. The mother not only carries the 
infant during gestation and gives birth to the child; she 
also often gives it nurishment biologically during 
infancy. Given this fact, the courts frequently noted 
both sociological and biological bases for the maternal 
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preference in the awarding of child custody. 
Eventually, the belief that the mother 
was the natural and proper custodian of her 
children became so widely assumed that it 
was rarely questioned and even more rarely 
challenged. As Roth recently observed, the 
rare rationales that were offered for the 
maternal preference had the ring of divine 
right theory. For example, an Idaho court 
concluded that the preference for the mother 
"needs no argument to support it because it 
arises out of the very nature and instincts 
of motherhood; nature has ordained it. 
Similarly, a 19-58 Ne\'7 Jersey decis~on re-
ferred to the preference as the result of 
an "inexorable natural force," and a 1972 
Maryland decision as a "primordial" material 
tie. 
In recent years some courts' justi-
fication for the maternal presumption seems 
to have shifted from the laws of nature to 
"the wisdom of the ages," as a 1973 appellate 
court phrased it. Along the same lines, a 
1975 Utah decision affirmed the presumption 
in favor of the mother because it was grounded 
in the wisdom inherent in traditional patterns 
of thought.l3 
In granting an award of sole custody the court 
seeks a home environment which is stable so that the 
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child will grow and develop in a setting which gives it 
a feeling of security. One parent is given sole, 
permanent custody so that the child will not be shuttled 
back and forth between homes, constantly reminding the 
child of its broken home and undermining that sought-
after security interest. The non-custodial parent, 
usually the father, is granted reasonable visitation 
privileges as it is in the child's best interest to 
have continuous relations with both parents. According 
to the literature, the "natural right" of non-custodial 
parent to visitation is in most jurisdictions subservient 
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to the best interests of the child. 14 While the court 
is hesitant to sever the bond between the natural parent 
and child, it will do so where the child's emotional or 
physical health is imperiled by contact with the non-
custodial parent. 15 Other jurisdictions, however, 
disagree as to whether it is a "right" or "privilege" 
of a parent to visit the child. 16 
The custodial parent is given sole authority over 
the child concerning every aspect of the child's develop-
ment. This includes-decisions regarding the child's 
health care, education, religious training, friends, 
activities, visitation, and any other decision affecting 
the child's life. The court's reasoning is the same in 
that stability is the major objective, and this goal 
will be best served by authority over the child being 
given to only one parent. 
Commentators on custodial law have noted that most 
states have at one time or another adopted the tender 
years doctrine, with its maternal preference, and even 
though adherence to the doctrine is waning, the effects 
of it are still apparent in custody disputes. According 
to a 1979 study conducted by the Census Bureau, the 
mother is awarded sole custody in ninety percent of the 
adjudicated cases, and the same study indicates that the 
mother also assumed custody in ninety percent of the 
h . h d'd h . d' ·- 1 1 t' 17 cases w ~c ~ not reac JU ~c~a reso u ~on. 
While some states still statutorily possess the tender 
years doctrine and base their custody decisions solely 
upon adherence to it, other states make use of it 
primarily as a "tie breaker." In other words, where 
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both parents are found to be fit and neither parent is 
entitled to custody of the child over the other parent 
as a matter of statutory right, courts in these states 
will use the tender years doctrine to tip the scales in 
favor of the mother. 18 
Another variation is states in which there is 
statutory equality between the sexes with regard to 
the custody decision but in which the judges have con-
tinued to give effect to the tender years presumption in 
their actual decisions awarding custody. 19 In effect, 
this leads almost to judicial nullification of the 
legislative intent to remove maternal preference. In at 
least one state, the legislative response to such 
judicial avoidance of the statutory language was to 
further amend the custodial statute to make it even more 
apparent that no preference whatsoever was to be given 
to the mother solely because of her sex in a parental 
dispute over custody of the child. 20 
Other states have rejected the maternal preference 
embodied in the tender years doctrine on constitutional 
grounds. 21 Full treatment of this equal protection 
basis for rejecting gender preference is reserved to a 
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later chapter of this thesis which will examine the 
development of constitutional law in the area of equal 
protection with emphasis on gender-based classification. 
It is apparent that the "best interest" standard 
has been used to achieve a variety of ends. At some 
times and in some states, it has been used to ratify the 
maternal preference contained in the tender years 
doctrine, but at other times in other states the same 
phrase has been employed to avoid the maternal preference 
while still attempting to vindicate the interest of the 
child in having the best possible upbringing following a 
divorce of its parents. 
Recent literature expresses a great deal of 
criticism of the maternal preference expressed in the 
tender years doctrine and suggests that indeed an award 
of sole maternal custody is not in the best interests of 
the child. 
Just as social sciences and the state of 
the American culture gave rise to the tender 
years doctrine , changes in American culture 
and the pronouncements of social sciences 
apparently underlie its demise.22 
Available data indicates that a child placed in the sole 
custody of the mother generally will not receive 
full-time nurturing, attention, and companionship at 
home. A 1975 study conducted by the National Council 
of Organizations for Children and Youth indicated that 
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in single-parent families headed by women, forty-seven 
percent of mothers of preschool age children were in the 
labor force and fifty-seven percent of mothers with 
school age children work outside the home. 23 Clearly, a 
grant of sole custody to the mother for the intended 
purpose of giving the child full-time care and nurturing 
by the mother is not achieving its purpose. 
Similarly, the child is not guaranteed economic 
security with a sole custody award to the mother. In an 
unpublished dissertation, it is shown that it is common 
for fathers simply to ignore their court-ordered respon-
sibility of supporting their children. 24 The author 
explains that fathers apparently feel that they not only 
divorce their spouse but their children as well. The 
support obligation which historically has fallen upon 
the father has become a problem of national significance 
as increasing numbers of divorced fathers have failed to 
provide this support. Congress has been prompted to 
legislate to help reduce the number of children who 
are placed on the public support rolls because of the 
d 1 . f f h h . bl' t. 25 e 1nquency o at ers on t e1r support o 1ga 1ons. 
The support obligation is treated in more detail later in 
this thesis, but it is commented upon at this point to 
indicate its relationship to the best interests of the 
child in the sole maternal custody award area concerning 
economic well-being. 
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Further problems common in the sole custody award 
are the actions and intentions of one parent to alienate 
the child's affection for the other parent and even the 
refusal to allow visitation by the non-custodial parent. 
Most often these problems end up back in court. Despite 
the divorce, it is common for divorced parents to fight 
the same old battles--this time on a new battleground. 
The new field of battle becomes the children rather than 
direct personal confrontation between the adults. Not 
only custody but also visitation becomes a battle with 
the "winner" being "awarded" custody and the "loser" 
. . 1 . . t t. . '1 26 rece1v1ng mere y v1s1 a 10n pr1v1 eges. 
The influential book, Beyond the Best Interests of 
the Child, by Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, which was 
published in 1973 suggested that sole custody is the only 
award that is in the best interests of the child. The 
need ·for stability and continuity both in the child's 
life after its parents divorce and in its relationship 
with the custodial parent is so great that ties with the 
non-custodial parent might need to be severed. The 
authors espouse the view that visitation accordingly 
should not be a court-awarded right or privilege, but 
rather should be left up to the sole discretion of the 
custodial parent. If for any reason the custodial 
parent deems it best for the child to have little or no 
contact with the non-custodial parent, neither the court 
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nor the non-custodial parent will be allowed to inter-
vene. Generally even though the courts have looked 
harshly upon this view, Beyond the Best Interests of the 
Child has been said to have slowed acceptance of alter-
27 native forms of child custody. 
In its earliest stages, the tender years doctrine 
was founded upon the romantic view of motherhood. The 
experience for the child of "mothering" (the warmth, 
consistency, and continuity of the relationship) is not 
dependent on the sex of the parent, as is noted in the 
current literature. The view that females alone, or 
even best, can provide the mothering function is based 
solely upon the stereotyped thinking and sociological 
views of an earlier time. It is the performance of 
the "mothering" function which fosters the healthy 
development of the child. This objective can be accom-
plished and "mother love" can be conferred on a child 
b f . h 28 y a parent o e~t er sex. 
Similarly, parental roles are no longer so clearly 
defined as they were during the period in which the 
tender years doctrine was gaining acceptance in American 
jurisdictions. Just as mothers were then considered to 
lack job skills, fathers were assumed to lack child-
rearing skills. Partly because an increasing number of 
mothers are entering the job market and therefore are 
unavailable to give full-time care to their children, 
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fathers have assumed a more active role in parenting. 
Having discovered the virtues of extensive contact with 
their children and perhaps encouraged by what they 
perceive as a more friendly judicial climate, fathers 
are demanding more equal rights and roles in child 
29 custody matters. As a result of increasing demands 
by fathers, criticism of the tender years doctrine in 
the literature, and willingness of at least some legis-
latures and judges to move beyond the maternal preference 
mandated by the tender years doctrine, the law in recent 
years has demonstrated an ability to consider alternative 
approaches to child custody. 
C.2. Joint Custody 
The legal system is adapting to changing roles of 
men and women and changing social patterns by experi-
menting with awards of joint custody rather than the more 
traditional award of sole custody. Very little attention 
has been given by courts or commentators to divided 
custody, but there is a growing trend toward acceptance 
of joint custody. Joint custody can be of two different 
forms. In de jure joint custody the arrangement is 
mandated by the court and is specifically provided for 
in the settlement or divorce decree, or both. De facto 
joint custody refers to an out-of-court agreement between 
the parents, and while the court is not required to honor 
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such agreements, it will frequently do so. 30 
From a legal point of view, joint custody generally 
involves two concepts--the sharing by parents of legal 
responsibility and the sharing of physical care and 
living responsibility regarding the child. The legal 
aspect includes joint decision-making about vital 
choices regarding the child's life. While the decision-
making function is usually shared equally, the physical 
custody over the child is not always equally divided. 
Foster and Freed, noted authors in the field of custody 
determination, argue that a frequent misperception about 
joint custody is the belief that actual physical custody 
must be shared on an equal-time basis, and they contend 
that this misconception has retarded the acceptance of 
the joint custody arrangement. 31 In a joint custody 
arrangement, there do not have to be major disruptions 
in the child's life, school, friends, religious training, 
or quality of care. Many options are available within 
the joint custody arrangement, and these should be shaped 
to fit the needs of each particular case. In a joint 
custody arrangement, the rights and obligations of the 
parents are similar to those of parents in the intact 
family. In short, joint custody means continued involve-
ment in the child's life by both parents and provides the 
best legal assurance of access to the child by both 
parents. 
24 
The disagreement and discord which characterizes the 
family prior to a separation or divorce is difficult for 
children. This situation, however, is only compounded by 
a sense of loss when a child is placed in the sole 
custody of one parent. 32 Admittedly, there are only 
small amounts of data available regarding the effects of 
divorce on children, and psychological theories are not 
reliable enough for purposes of predictions. Long-range 
empirical research on the effects of custody alternatives 
is also limited and elementary with only one exception. 
[R]esearchers are finding that the key 
variable affecting satisfactory adjust-
ment of children following divorce is the 
extent of continuing involvement by both 
parents in child rearing. Similiary, 
divorces having the least detrimental 
effect on the normal development of 
children are those in which the parents 
are able to coo~erate in their continuing 
parental roles. 3 
The child's loss is clear--it needs two caring, 
involved parents. Other studies, while not of the long-
range and predictive type scholars desire, indicate that 
in the sole custody of one parent children have more 
trouble in developing confidence and self-worth. 
Particularly in the instance of sole maternal custody, 
boys tend to be disruptive and less receptive in school 
while daughters develop too great dependence on and 
attachment to the mother. Children often feel anxious 
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because they feel that if one parent has already 
"abandoned" them, they cannot be certain that the other 
parent will not also leave them. In order to protect 
themselves from such a second loss, children become 
afraid to disobey the custodial parent both in actions 
and belief. Refusal to see the non-custodial parent 
on the part of the child is not unusual if the child can 
sense the custodial parent's approval of this action. 
For the non-custodial parent to force this issue only 
compounds the problem. 34 
Children also view the non-custodial parent as a 
second-class citizen. If the child identifies with him 
or her, then the child's sense of self-worth is severly 
damaged. Further, children in sole-custody homes have 
no role models of both sexes on which to pattern their 
b h . 35 e av~or. 
"Winner-take-all" custody decisions tend to aggra-
vate parental differences and cause predictable post-
divorce disputes with each parent attempting to get the 
last word. 36 Joint custody attempts to alleviate these 
various damaging circumstances as well as to enhance the 
parent-child relationship. 
The literature on joint custody notes that the 
severity of problems which accompany joint custody is 
a valid cause for concern and that in some instances the 
disadvantages may outweigh the benefits. The problems 
are not necessarily insurmountable, however, and they 
should not automatically preclude consideration of a 
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joint-custody arrangement. The concerns and objections 
most often expressed in considering joint custody fall 
into two categories--parental conflict and disruption to 
the child enhanced by a lack of finality in the custody 
decree. 
The major problem confronting a joint-custody 
arrangement is the interaction between divorced parents. 
By definition, joint custody entails continuous parental 
cooperation. It can be argued that parents who did not 
get along in the marriage will only perpetuate the 
antagonism and disagreements in a joint-custody situation. 
Presumably, if the parents could agree, they would still 
be married and the custody issue would never have arisen. 
Further, it is feared that parents will use the child as 
a weapon against each other and create loyalty conflicts 
in the child along with other emotional stress. 
In response to this question as raised in the 
literature, commentators reply that this argument 
applies equally well to any custody decree--including 
the most common form, sole custody. Where even minimal 
contact is excessive in some cases, the court is probably 
still giving some visitation priviliges to the non-
custodial parent. In addition, the support obligation 
is also present and can well entail some form of contact. 
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Problems in visitation and support obligation contact 
can often force parents back into court for clarification 
of their respective rights and obligations. Therefore, 
it is apparent that it is not the custody decree itself 
but the child and its needs that necessitate the pro-
1 • f th I 1 • h • 3 7 ong~ng o e parents re at~ons ~p. Blame should not 
be displaced to the nature of the custody arrangement 
when in reality the problems are present regardless of 
the type of decree. Some authors suggest that when 
parents exhibit strong animosity, the courts should 
impose restrictions on their interaction such as 
requiring the visiting parent to pick the child up at 
school or some other "neutral" location rather than at 
the home of the other parent to avoid direct face-to-
face contact which might result in the animosity being 
exhibited in the presence of, and to the detriment of, 
the child. 38 
The second major criticism of joint custody noted in 
the recent literature has two parts. First, there is the 
lack of permanence in the decree itself. The second 
concern is the instability of the child's environment. 
According to a U.C.L.A. Law Review article, both aspects 
of the argument are flawed. The impermanence of the 
joint-custody decree depends ultimately on the relation-
ship of the parents. For parents who are able to put 
aside personal bickering and revenge in order to work 
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out the "best" arrangement for their child, it is 
unlikely that there will be a return to court for a 
modification of the decree. The argument assumes that 
one or the other parent will return to court for a 
modification of the decree so as to grant them sole 
custody. In response, it is noted that impermanence 
exists in any decree because they are always subject to 
later modification. 39 A study conducted by Roman 
concluded that joint custody decrees are less likely to 
go back to court for modification than are sole custody 
decrees; rather, in the joint custody arrangement there 
is a greater likelihood that the parents will work out 
disagreements between themselves without any formal 
modification of the court's order. 40 
Joint custody by definition means the child is 
frequently shuttled between parents. The second facet 
of the argument against joint custody contends that the 
constant shifting is detrimental to the child's need for 
security, stability, and general psychological growth. 
In response to the contention concerning shuttling of 
children, it is noted that this is not a problem which 
is exclusive to joint-custody situations. It occurs 
with frequency in sole custody arrangements. Visitation 
can be weekly visits, weekends, and even partial summer 
vacations. Further, it can be argued that the frequent 
juggling of work, time, and social life may force the 
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custodial parent in a sole-custody situation to rely 
on sitters and others outside the home in caring for the 
child in such a way as to create more uncertainty than 
would occur in a joint-custody arrangement. 
The second facet of the argument relates to the 
instability of the child's environment caused by the 
shifting of the child between parents. It is noted 
that this presumption is not supported by psychological 
'd 41 ev~ ence. Accordingly, some experts feel that a 
continuous, meaningful relationship with both parents 
outweighs the difficulties faced by children in post-
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marital reorganization of family structure. 
Numerous minor problems also exist with the joint-
custody alternative. Often the arrangement requires that 
parents' mobility be restricted. Courts often require 
that the ex-spouses live in close proximity to each other 
to facilitate the exchange of children, but some courts 
are not inclined to find distance between the places of 
parental residences an impediment to an award of joint 
custody. For the courts which insist on close proximity, 
the alternative is complete loss of custody, and it is 
to be assumed that such loss of custody is to be borne 
by the parent who is willing to move away from the 
children. 43 
There also are physical and monetary problems in 
shifting a child from one horne to another. The child 
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must of necessity have clothing, toys, and other items. 
Transporting these items from home to home can be a 
serious barrier to smooth operation of a joint-custody 
arrangement, and it may be a financial impossibility to 
duplicate these items in both homes. 
To the extent that systematic evaluation of joint 
custody on the child is available, there is the indi-
cation that the concerns voiced above as objections 
against such arrangements are not justified. The authors 
conclude that families who are committed to making joint 
custody work deal with conflict in a constructive fashion 
of negotation and acceptance~and are able to make the 
children feel loved and secure in two homes. 
A study conducted in New York by Roman looked at the 
impact of child absence on the father rather than the 
traditional absence of the father in relation to the 
children. Roman advocates joint custody as a presumption 
in all cases, following the results of intensive inter-
views of fif·ty middle-income fathers who had been 
divorced no more than two years and who had children 
44 
between the ages of three and twelve years. 
Roman concluded that the two most often voiced 
criticisms of joint custody, parental conflict and 
disruption to children, either failed to materialize or 
were outweighed by the benefits of joint custody. Some 
of the conflict is dismissed merely by the parents' 
simply opting for joint custody rather than each 
struggling to be victorious over the other in a battle 
for sole custody with the children as the prize. 
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Further, there is no guarantee of harmony in the 
traditional custody arrangement and often the custodial 
parent uses custody and visitation over the non-custodial 
parent as a weapon, and the children are caught in the 
middle. Roman asserts that joint custody more fully 
satisfies parental needs. In traditional, sole-custody, 
form, the mother is usually shut in with the children, 
and the father is shut out. Joint custody allows both 
parents to be involved with their children and to share 
burdens and joys of child raising. 
In response to the "child as yo-yo" disruption of 
changing residences, Roman asserts that this argument 
simply is not supported by the evidence. Instead, joint 
custody offers the most satisfactory living arrangement 
with its flexibility allowing it to evolve through the 
different stages of the children's development. 
As a device to resolve differences between parents 
which become sufficiently severe as to threaten the 
viability of a joint-custody arrangement, Roman advocates 
the use of family conciliation courts, counselors, and 
mental health professionals as an alternative to the 
adversary relationship fostered by reliance upon the 
normal court process to reach a custody decision. 
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The first in-depth study of joint custody was 
conducted by Professor Alice Abarbanel in the San 
Francisco Bay area. Abarbanel studied the practice of 
joint custody by four families and analyzed the effects 
of the arrangements on both parents and children. The 
four families studied included seven children between 
the ages of four and twelve years. All parents had been 
married for six to seven and one-half years, and they 
had been separated between one and two years. Living 
arrangements varied, and allocation of child care 
responsibilities ranged from fifty-fifty to sixty-six-
thirty-three. All parents lived within close proximity 
to their ex-spouses. 45 
This study found that children were generally well-
adjusted and comfortable in the living situation of two 
homes, even though they were unhappy about the separation 
of their parents. The children continued to have two 
psychological parents and experienced each in discipline, 
play, and daily routine situations. Further, Abarbanel 
found that this constant close communication with both 
parents thwarted the efforts of children to play one 
parent off against the other. 
Abarbanel concluded that joint custody is neither 
inherently good nor inherently bad but works best when 
certain conditions are present. Parents must first make 
a commitment to make joint custody work. Each parent 
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must support the other and encourage the other's 
relationship with the child. Much flexibility in 
scheduling, planning, and sharing of responsibility is 
required. Each parent also needs to distinguish his or 
her past relationship with the ex-spouse from the role 
of a parent. 
Now in its initial stages is the Joint Custody 
Study Project which is co-sponsored by the Jewish Family 
and Children's Services and by California Women Lawyers. 
It is a comprehensive study of joint custody in San 
Francisco which is gathering information and identifying 
factors characteristic of families with successful joint 
custody arrangements. The goal is to make concrete 
information available to attorneys and counselors to 
give assistance for those seeking joint custody. 46 While 
this project is not sufficiently far into the reporting 
of its research to be of value in this thesis, it is a 
firm indication of the commitment to research in this 
area which may assist in an empirical evaluation of the 
pros and cons of joint custody in comparison with the 
more traditional, sole custody decree. In those courts 
which are responsive to such empirical data, the results 
of this and similar studies may have an impact on further 
modification of the pattern of custody awards. 
Preliminary conclusions drawn from the studies 
discussed above indicate that in a substantial number of 
cases joint custody helped to "sooth the wounds and 
make the transition to post-divorce life a smoother 
one." 47 
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In addition to attempts to refute the purported 
disadvantages of joint custody, the literature has 
compiled a number of positive attributes to the joint-
custody arrangement. It can bring advantages to the 
child, mother, and father as well as sociological and 
psychological benefits to family relations. 
Children of divorced parents feel bewildered and 
often even guilty for their parents' divorce. In the 
midst of this confusion, they must choose between their 
parents as a result of the parental power struggle in 
a bitter situation or as a self-imposed mandate in a more 
harmonious situation between the parents as the divorce 
is completed. 48 Joint custody can help to alleviate 
both situations. Where parents are using children as 
weapons or pawns in their own power struggle, joint 
custody provides an environment in which the child does 
not have to make a choice. Both parents are still 
involved in the child's life and so the threat of being 
a "winner" or "loser" is abolished. Joint custody also 
can raise the parents' self-esteem and eliminate the 
need to manipulate the child's affections. 
Further, joint custody offers the opportunity to 
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develop a more natural and individualized relationship 
with each parent. In a sole-custody environment, the 
non-custodial parent usually visits all of the children 
at the same time. This type of arrangement gives the 
non-custodial parent almost no chance to parent--because 
it is extremely difficult tp provide close, individual 
attention to each child. This is especially true when 
the children are of a different age or sex. Trying to 
converse with a teenager and entertain an elementary 
school age child at the same time would most likely be 
fruitless. 49 
Joint custody provides a chance for the child and 
parent to communicate on every level including discipline, 
normal day-to-day activities, and play time. Individual 
contact can be made with each child rather than in a 
. 'f' . 1 t . 50 group 1n an art1 1c1a se t1ng. 
Joint custody can also benefit the parents as well 
as the child. The literature questions whether it is 
valid to consider only the interests of the child when 
those interests are inexplicably intertwined and bound 
to the best interest of the family. 51 Again, as is the 
case with impact on children, there is little systematic 
evidence on the effects of divorce on adults. What 
little information is available agrees with the results 
of a study by Roman and Haddad. According to these 
authors, mothers who obtained sole custody of their 
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children feel that their children overburden and 
imprison them. "Further evidence shows that these 
mothers become physically and emotionally exhuasted, 
as well as socially isolated." 52 Mothers with sole 
custody not only have full responsibility for the children 
but often must also work outside the home in order to 
supplement the amount received from her ex-spouse in 
child support. She may be at a distinct disadvantage if 
she has dropped out of the work force to raise a family 
or if further education or training is needed to advance 
her skill. The alternative obviously is a low-paying 
job. 
Often a mother may simply not want sole custody of 
the children but may be hesitant to reveal her feelings. 
Where "motherhood 11 by some case law is something just 
short of divine, women may feel that there is something 
selfish or unnatural in not wanting sole custody of her 
children. The notion is still with us that when a mother 
is not given sole custody of her children something is 
radically wrong with her. 
If mothers feel overburdened, then fathers must 
naturally be underburdened. Recent celebrated decisions, 
such as the Salk decision, 53 and influential books such 
as The Disposable Parent, 54 are laying to rest the notion 
that fathers walk away from a divorce "scott free." In 
an unpublished dissertation by Judith Greif, evidence 
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showed that men experience stress expressed in physical 
problems, depression, and a severe sense of loss. 55 In 
a typical award of sole custody to the mother, men lose 
wife, home, and children and receive only visitation 
rights and support obligations. Foster and Freed 
indicate than men often become so overwhelmed by these 
difficulties and pain that they give up seeing their 
children in order to avoid more hurt. 56 When the 
interest in the children is gone, it generally means 
that support payments are less likely to be made. 
Joint custody can be advantageous to both parents. 
It has been noted that "mothers reported the greatest 
advantage they saw in joint custody was the sharing of 
responsibility for the children," whereas men noted an 
"opportunity for the child to maintain contact with both 
parents." 57 Both parents are given more free time, 
less constant responsibility, a chance to be more involved 
with other interests, and a more natural relationship 
with the child. Moreover, there is a psychological 
benefit in joint custody. Improving the psychological 
health of one member of the family results in the improved 
emotional well-being of the entire family unit. 58 It 
gives the divorcing family a chance to "reorganize" 
rather than "break up." Parental bonds can remain intact, 
and the situation can be the closest possible to the 
situation found in families which remain intact. 
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While joint custody may be the exception rather than 
the rule, some type of shared custody is judicially 
recognized in at least twenty-eight states. At the 
present time, California, North Carolina, Iowa, Oregon, 
and Wisconsin statutorily provide the court with a joint-
custody option. Joint-custody legislation presently is 
under consideration in Illinois, New York, Minnesota, 
Connecticut, Ner Jersey, Ohio, and Utah, while still 
other states are enacting legislation recognizing fathers 1 
so 
rights in custody matters (Arkansas and Alaska) . J 
Joint custody has proceeded with the statutory authority 
directing "as the case may warrant," as "is necessary 
and proper," as the children's "spiritual as well other 
interests may require," and "best interests." 60 
Joint custody also appears consistent with the 
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. Section 402 uses the 
"best interests" test and requires that the court 
determine custody. It is noted that this is distinguish-
able from a direction to designate a single custodian. 61 
The court is given broad discretion through the language 
of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act in order to 
promote its underlying purposes. The "best interests" 
standard is the summation of the five factors designated 
by the Act to determine the meaning of phrase. Section 
402, subsections A through E, includes the following 
factors: the wishes of the child's parents, the wishes 
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of the child, the interaction and interrelationships of 
the child with the custodian and other siblings, the 
child's adjustment to home, school, and community, and 
finally, th~ mental and physical health of all individ-
uals involved. 
Upon examination of the current literature, it 
appears that the general agreement is that joint custody 
is workable in almost all situations. Few problems are 
insurmountable that would preclude anything except a 
sole custody arrangement. Because courts have limited 
experience in applying the "best interest" standard in 
a joint-custody arrangement, or for that matter with any 
standard in a joint-custody arrangement, commentators 
have suggested guidelines to assist the courts in making 
joint-custody determinations. 
Although there is some variation, a few suggested 
guidelines are apparent in all of the literature. 
Because joint custody benefits both parents and children 
through shared authority similar to that within an intact 
marriage, courts should decree joint custody when there 
are certain factors present. First, both parents must be 
fit. A finding of parental fitness assures that the 
child will not be subjected to the care of a parent who 
is incapable or unwilling to provide for the child 1 s 
needs and is designed to protect the child from harm. 
The finding of fitness also protects parents as it could 
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prevent the other parent from seeking modification of the 
decree on the grounds that the other parent is unfit. 
It also should be noted that a fit parent is not required 
to have been a perfect parent with regard to extra-
marital relationships prior to the divorce. The effect 
of this relationship on the child (note that there will 
be wide and varied judicial discretion on this point) and 
the parent's ability to care for the child should be 
considered rather than the court's adopting a per se 
rule that any such relationship automatically makes a 
parent "unfit" for custody purposes. 62 
Courts likewise should grant joint custody when both 
parents wish to continue their active involvement in 
raising the child. If one parent does not wish to have 
continued active involvement with the child, the court 
need not go further in the consideration of a possible 
award of joint custody. 
The court also should grant joint custody where 
the parents are capable of making reasoned decisions in 
their child's life. 63 Even if parents in the emotional 
heat of a divorce have not made reasoned decisions 
together in the best interests of the child, the judge 
may find that they are are still capable of doing so in 
the future. It should not be assumed that interspousal 
difficulties cannot be put aside for the purposes of 
raising a child. The judge must look to see if this 
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potential exists even if only in certain areas. The 
decree can be written so as to give custody over a 
certain area to only one parent and yet have a joint-
custody arrangement in all other facets of child-rearing 
responsibilities. The court could simply make arrange-
ments for the child regarding the contested concern, 
yet in all other areas the parents could share respon-
64 sibility equally. One article even suggests that the 
couple should establish at the time of dissolution of 
the marriage a means for arbitration if disputes arise 
in the future which cannot be resolved by .a:gree1nent. 
Agreement on a neutral arbitrator--a pro-
fessional counselor, clergyman or lawyer--
or a means of choosing one when the need 
arises, should be made in advance of the 
disagreement.65 
In the increasing number of jurisdictions offering court-
connected counseling, such arbitration service is readily 
available and can be made a condition of joint custody. 
The court also may consider whether joint custody 
would disrupt the parent-child relationship less than 
other custody arrangements. A parent who prior to 
divorce did not take an active part in child care or 
decision-making (assuming this was voluntary and not as 
a result of spousal subterfuge) may not be in a position 
to do so after the divorce. The court should seek to 
structure the custody arrangement so as to minimize any 
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disruptive effect on the child. 66 
In addition to the previously mentioned criteria, 
it is suggested in the literature that parents work out 
the logistics of their arrangement between themselves 
(when possible) prior to judicial determination. This 
would include division of time the child spends with each 
parent, the welfare of the child regarding health care 
and education, financial arrangements, signing of report 
cards, vacations, camp, replenishing of clothing, and 
a variety of other items. These, however, change over 
time and can be adjusted to fit new needs which arise 
at various phases of the child's growth and development. 
A single system for meeting these problems ne.ed not be 
dictated by the court, and the judge should be open to 
whatever arrangements best suit the needs of the parents 
and the child or children. 67 
Two aspects of joint custody which need individual 
attention are the logistics of moving children between 
parents and monetary concerns. The aspect of geographic 
relationship of the place of residence of the parents 
requires clarification. A few authors, most notably 
Roman and Haddad in The Disposable Parent, indicate that 
close geographic proximity is essential to a successful 
joint custody plan. Foster and Freed, however, contend 
that this is not necessarily true. The determining 
factor, in their view, depends on the division of the 
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actual time the child resides with each parent. Summer 
vacations and alternating holidays may be the times in 
which a change of location for the children may be 
accomplished over a relatively great distance. By its 
very nature, joint custody can be tailored to meet the 
d f h . f. . t . 68 nee s o eac spec1 1c s1 uat1on. 
A second consideration is whether many families can 
actually afford joint custody. The answer to the 
question often depends upon the identity of the person 
responding to it. One judge has acknowledged that joint-
custody parents have to have a good deal of money for the 
arrangment to work. 69 A family therapist and long-time 
researcher and advocate of joint custody claims that an 
extra rolled-up sleeping bag in the closet is enough--
it depends upon the children's sense of bel 0 nging. 70 
As was mentioned earlier in this thesis, non-
custodial parents tend to stop seeing their children 
after divorce. Support payments after divorce also often 
are short lived. It is argued that one of the most 
positive attributes of joint custody is its potential 
for avoiding this problem of non-support generated by 
the bitterness over the custody battle. Not only does 
continuous contact with the children create incentive to 
provide for their needs, but participating in routine 
activities of feeding, clothing, and housing brings home 
to the parents the ever-increasing expenses of rearing 
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them. This awareness tends to promote a more flexible 
attitude toward the finances involved in care for the 
child or children. It also brings ·to reality what each 
parent can monetarily contribute to the child's needs. 
Financial arrangements can be divided on an equal payment 
basis, or they can be computed on a pro rata basis 
according to the income of each parent. In addition, 
there is nothing to prevent one parent from voluntarily 
assuming responsibility for clothing and primary 
maintenance, with monetary support being supplied by 
the other parent. Perhaps each can assume different 
duties that each respectively likes to perform in order 
to avoid the unnecessary duplication of items or 
duties. In any event, no one system must be imposed, 
but the court is encouraged to respect what is in both 
the best interest of the child and of the parents. 
While most of the attention has been given to what 
factors are critical to a successful joint-custody 
arrangement, Foster and Freed have listed criteria when 
joint custody is not advisable (although some of these 
may be contradictory to others perviously noted criteria 
advanced by other authors) . They indicate that joint 
custody should be rejected when each party is unalterably 
opposed to joint custody or the animosity and hostility 
between parents is so great that joint care and respon-
sibility is not feasible. Courts should reject awarding 
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joint custody where one parent's work hours make it a 
practical impossibility--such as an obstetrical nurse 
with erratic work hours which are not susceptible to 
being made regular. Further, where it is shown that 
the child is confused by conflicting decisions or 
practices of the parents, they argue that joint custody 
should not be granted. Finally, where the child rebels 
against, or is strongly opposed to, joint custody the 
court should not award it. 71 
Another author contends that the greatest fear 
courts have regarding joint custody ironically is the 
same fear that they entertain in the award of sole 
custody to a single parent--loyalty conflicts. The 
author concedes, however, that in joint custody these 
loyalty conflicts are at least maintained openly. The 
children are aware that they are expected to love and 
to want to be with each parent--even though the parents 
1 . d d 1' . . .. 1 h 72 are no onger marr~e an ~v~ng ~n a s~ng e orne. 
~.Vhile a few critic isms of joint custody have been 
noted in the literature, and while some judges continue 
to resist movement in this direction, it appears that the 
trend (both legislatively and in the literature} is 
toward increasing acceptance of joint custody as an 
alternative to the traditional award of sole custody to 
one parent as was the case under the "tender years" rule. 
This trend, even though it may be developing slowly, is 
'-
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a clearly identifiable one. It has not, however, been 
sufficient to end difficulties alluded to earlier in 
the treatment of the tender years doctrine--the problems 
surrounding visitation rights. While joint custody 
theoretically ends the notion of one parent having 
custody while the other only has visitation "rights" or 
"privileges," the literature has continued to deal with 
this topic, sometimes as a separate matter, and the 
next section of this thesis will briefly deal with this 
aspect of commentary on custody. 
C.J. The Visitation Problem 
The opponents of joint custody criticize those 
favoring joint custody awards and not only the award of 
joint custody. Most often the opponents claim that the 
champions of joint custody overlook the fact that, on 
the whole, courts award substantial visitation privileges 
to a fit non-custodial parent. The order is in terms of 
"reasonable visitation," and the parties are left free 
to implement details as to physical possession, as long 
as they can agree. 
In some sense, therefore, some of the agitation 
for joint custody really involves status seeking 
as legal custodian (or co-custodian) ~ or "one-
upsmanship," since meaningful association with 
both parents is common under the traditional 
sole custody, subject to visitation formula.73 
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The central issues of visitation is the emotional 
and psychological health of the children of divorced 
parents. Specifically, what visitation "rights" and 
"privileges," if any, should be granted to the non-
custodial parent in order to enhance the well-being of 
the parent and child? 
In theory, the judicial attitude is that the 
paramount concern is the "best interest of the child." 
The courts have taken the view that the best interest of 
the child is to have a continuing association with the 
non-custodial parent. 
The courts refer to these visitation "rights" 
as a claim, subservient to the best interest 
of the child, and not as a legal right per se. 
But on the other hand, the legal "right" of 
visitation which purportedly has been demoted 
to claim status is in practice an absolute 
right. Only in extreme and unusual circum-
stances will visitation be totally denied.74 
A 1977 article by Henszey examines some of the more 
common instances in which visitation usually is denied. 75 
Th~ jurisdictions are split over whether failure to make 
support payments justifies complete denial of visitation 
rights. The majority view is that it is not. The duty 
of support has been shown to be wholly independent of 
visitation. The minority view, however, holds that 
when nonsupport is contumacious, it can be justifiable 
to withhold visitation privileges. Also, where the 
child's apparent indifference or desire not to see the 
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non-custodial parent is present, the court will take 
this into consideration. If it is apparent to the court 
that the unwillingness is a result of influence by the 
custodial parent, the court will ignore these desires. 
The jurisdictions are unanimous that where there 
are acts, threats, or fear of physical violence present, 
complete denial of visitation is appropriate. 
The jurisdictions are not unanimous when it comes 
to sexual and moral conduct of the non-custodial parent, 
"[h]ence, the cases indicate that only the most base form 
of sexual or moral conduct will threaten visitation 
rights.'' 76 
For parents who threaten or attempt to remove the 
children from the court's jurisdiction, denial of 
visitation rights depends on whether it was the custodial 
or non-custodial parent who lodged the threat. Further, 
for claims of abandonment or where there is a lapse of 
time between visits, courts are reluctant but will at 
times deny visitation privileges. 
One area in which Henszey condemns the courts' 
policy with regard to visitation is the instance where 
one parent makes derogatory remarks against the other 
parent. A judicial reprimand is usually what occurs. 
Henszey feels that the courts are being too naive, and 
since the emotional well-being of the child is at stake, 
the court should as a matter of policy deliver a more 
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severe reprimand coupled with a threat to award custody 
to the other parent if the situation does not improve. 
Several alternatives to the current situation 
concerning visitation are summarized in the Henszey 
article. These include simply allowing the custodial 
parent to make all decisions concerning visitation, the 
use of a committee to reach decisions on the matter in 
accord with the child's best interest, the use of family 
courts to adjudicate the issue, and the establishing of 
joint custody. Similarly, uniform guidelines for-judicial 
discretion in visitation decisions could be adopted as 
an alternative to the current patchwork system. 
C.4. The su:eport Obli9"ation 
Parental support obligations have become a matter of 
increasing public concern, with the primary focus at 
present being directed toward the problem of locating 
the absent parent and forcing him or her to contribute 
t . 77 supper mon~es. Much less attention has been given to 
the underlying questions of the nature of the support 
obligation and the extent of each parent's obligation 
and duty to support his or her child. While the consti-
tutional issue is taken up in a later portion of this 
thesis, a brief history of the support obligation is 
warranted as well as a description of the present law 
and trends in this area. 
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At early common law, the obligation to support one's 
own child was considered to be merely a moral obligation 
and not sufficient to bind either parent legally. 78 
Under the principle of coveture at common law, women were 
denied the ability to hold property, and their husbands 
were given sole control over the family assets. 
Coverture thus shielded married women from the financial 
responsibilities of spousal and child support, while it 
. gave men both the benefits and the burdens associated 
with the holding of property. It was the common law 
duty of the husband to support his wife, even if the 
wife had vocational ability and regardless of her 
previous financial standing. The husband simply was 
responsible financially for his wife and for the 
fulfillment of purchases in order for the wife to per-
form her household duties. This judicial characteri-
zation of women as financially dependent upon men 
extended beyond marriage through separation, divorce, 
and widowhood. The American states built on this 
foundation with alimony statutes which sought to prevent 
women from becoming public charges once they were removed 
from the shelter provided by their husband's income. 79 
The considerations noted above also persuaded the 
courts to assign the child support obligations to the 
fathers. Women were by common law presumption weaker by 
nature, and mothers were not entitled to the services of 
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their children, but only to their respect. Just as 
women were free from alimony payments to financially 
dependent ex-husbands, so mothers generally were 
relieved of the duty of providing financial support for 
their children, both during and after marriage. 
As the moral obligation moved into a legal one, the 
majority of courts placed the burden of child support 
solely on the father. 80 In every jurisdiction, it is 
an enforceable duty by statute or common law, 81 and it 
. generally is imposed in one of three~distinct ways: 
(1) placement of an absolute duty of support on the 
father, (2) placement of primary duty of support on the 
father accompanied by a secondary duty on the mother, or 
(3) placement of a presumptively equal duty on both 
82 parents. 
Under the traditional view, the father's obligation 
to support his children is exclusive regardless of the 
wife's separate income, assets, and earnings. The 
inequity of this view is clearly apparent in the case of 
Bill v. Bill, 290 N.E.2d 749 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972f, where 
at the time of the divorce the father's net worth was 
$106,639. The mother, as beneficiary of a trust fund, 
had a net worth of over $450,000 and had made substantial 
financial contributions to the marriage. The father was 
appealing from an order to pay $240 a week in child 
support. Despite its apparent reluctance about its 
decision, the court stated that even 
[t]emporary forced indebtedness of the father 
and affluence of the mother ... do not miti-
gate a father's firml¥ established duty to 
support his progeny.B 
The court disregarded the mother's past and present 
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ability to make money as well as the established family 
practice of her doing so. Tradition and precedent 
compelled the court to perpetuate a double standard which 
was manifestly inappropriate in the case to which it was 
applied. 
Most jurisdictions have retreated from ab-
solute liability to a rule under which the 
father is primarily liable for support pay-
ments and the mother "secondarily liable.'•84 
There is some disagreement on when the mother's secondary 
liability comes into play. Usually the father is the 
sole obligor upon whom the legal duty rests and only when 
he is unable to fulfill this legal obligation does the 
legal duty become enforceable against the mother. 
In the Missouri case of O'Brien v. O'Brien, 485 
S.W.2d 674 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972), the father had full 
custody of one child, shared custody with the mother over 
a second child, and the mother had full custody of the 
third child. The trial court ruled a child support 
award of $250 a month in favor of the mother. Upon 
appeal charging that the trial court had abused its 
discretion in a situation in which there was evidence 
showing that the ex-wife had adequate means to support 
herself and the children in her custody, the court of 
appeals affirmed the award, claiming the invidual 
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circumstance did not outweigh the well-established rule 
in that jurisdiction that it is the primary duty of the 
father to support and educate his children notwith-
standing the fact that the mother may have independent 
financial means. 
It appears that the primary duty is more than a 
presumption in favor of a father's duty to support the 
children of the marriage. 
It normally amounts to an irrebutable legal 
duty which is abrogated only by circumstances 
rendering the father's fulfillment impossible 
or nearly so. The measure of the father's 
obligation is the child's needs in relation 
to the father's station in life, his pecuniary 
resources, and his earning ability honestly 
exercised.85 · 
This appears very close to absolute liability. Death 
appears to be the most certain relief from primary 
liability, but even this is not absolute as the father 
is sometimes required to carry life insurance on himself 
'th th h'ld b f' . . B6 w~ e c ~ ren as ene ~c~ar~es. 
In the early 1970's courts began to reconsider 
state's conferral of child support benefits solely on 
women. The change in the decisions has been slow in 
developing, partly because new opportunities for women 
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have not radically changed the economic inequality 
between the sexes and partly because of judicial 
reluctance to depart from established precedent even in 
th f f h . . 1 d . d. . 87 e ace o c ang~ng soc~a an econom~c con ~t~ons. 
The most recent trend with regard to the support 
obligation noted in the literature is to allocate the 
responsibility between both parents; that is, to place 
a presumptively equal duty on each parent to support the 
children financially. This idea of equal obligation of 
both parents to support their dependent minor children 
is consistent with the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. 
The Act refers to "either or both parents owing a duty 
of support" and lists factors to be considered by courts 
when determining respective support obligations. 
Section 309 includes the following determinative factors: 
{1) the financial resources of the child, (2) the 
financial resources of the custodial parent, (3) the 
standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the· 
marriage not been dissolved, (4) the physical and 
emotional condition of the child and his educational 
needs, and (5) the financial resources and needs of the 
non-custodial parent. 
The statute in no way is detrimental to the child 
with regard to his or her continuing support assurance; 
rather, it is meant to increase the level of assurance 
by having both financially able parents legally obligated 
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to provide such financial support. Each parent is to 
be held simultaneously liable for a reasonable portion 
of the support obligation. 
An excellent summary of the factors considered in 
most jurisdictions, although concentrating specifically 
on Pennsylvania law, is found in the Dickenson Law 
Review. 88 The author notes the division of a family 
almost always involves financial hardship, and the court 
must face the reality of having to_distribute the burdens 
of such financial hardship in an equitable manner. The 
factors normally taken into account include the needs of 
the child (including both past and projected future 
experiditures) , earnings of the parents in terms of 
capacity to produce income and their living expenses, 
equalizing the parental burden (taking into consideration 
the greater responsibility of the custodial parent), and 
other factors which arise in only some cases--including 
income of the child, trust fund income, and prior agree-
ment between the parents. 
D. Summary 
Sole custody arrangements developed at a time when 
divorce was unusual. The major criticism of sole custody 
is that it frequently deprives the child of divorced 
parents of a close relationship with one parent. Further 
problems develop for the child and the parents because of 
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the sole custody arrangement, including disputes over 
visitation, alienation of affection, legal decision-
making affecting the child's development, and increased 
likelihood of failure of the non-custodial parent to 
provide financial support. 
Today, as divorce rates soar, alternative forms of 
custody which do not divorce the parent from the child 
have come to the attention of judges, attorneys, legis-
lators in the states, and commentators in the journals 
related to law. There is a pressing need to develop 
new custodial arrangements to deal more adequately with 
the needs of children and parents following divorce. 
Joint custody, the most promising alternative to 
sole custody in the view of a majority of those writing 
on the topic, is not a "cure all," but it appears to 
be growing in judicial popularity. It allows for greater 
contact between the child and both parents, continues to 
the maximum degree feasible the condition of joint 
parental decision-making concerning the child's welfare 
and development which would be present in the intact 
family, allows flexibility and the possibility of change 
as the child matures and parental needs change (without 
the necessity for a return to court to modify the decree), 
and minimizes the sense of loss and dislocation to the 
child and parents. While there has been some criticism 
of joint custody in the literature, the majority position 
continues to be supportive of judicial experimentation 
with joint custody. 
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Visitation arrangements and child support obligation 
also are treated in the literature which deals with 
divorce and gender-based distinctions. These topics, 
however, have not received the extensive coverage given 
joint custody and other alternatives to the common law 
sole custody presumption which has so long dominated 
American jurisdictions. While there has been some 
movement toward a more equal balancing of monetary 
obligations between the custodial parent (usually the 
mother) and the non-custodial parent (normally the 
father), neither the commentators nor the courts have 
undertaken massive movement in this area. 
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CHAPTER III 
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF OKLAHOMA 
CHILD CUSTODY AND SUPPORT LAW 
A. Introduction 
One of the recently developed constitutional law 
doctrines in the United States is the equal protection 
analysis applied to gender-based classifications. The 
United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Four-
teenth Amendment's equal protection clause to provide at 
least some protection against state action which unfairly 
classifies individuals on the basis of gender. The 
language of the Amendment, which provides, "No state shall 
• . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws," was first interpreted by the 
Supreme Court to limit gender-based discrimination in 
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Subsequent decisions 
by the Court have also made use of the Fifth Amendment's 
due process clause to place similar barriers against 
national governmental classification by gender. While 
it is probably accurate to state that the drafters of the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not intend by its terms to 
grant greater equality between the sexes, the law has 
come too far in the last decade to deny its applicability 
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to such types of governmental classification. This 
chapter will detail the development of the gender-based 
equal protection doctrine, attempt to demonstrate its 
applicability to the area of child custody and support 
law, and analyze Oklahoma statutory and decisional law 
in an equal protection context. In studying the Okla-
homa law, three hypotheses will be examined. First, it 
is hypothesized that Oklahoma will not have been in the 
lead among states in terms of adopting alternatives to 
the traditional sole maternal custody award discussed in 
Chapter II. Second, it is hypothesized that Oklahoma 
appellate courts will be reluctant to intervene to over-
turn custody and support decisions rendered by judges 
in the trial courts of the state. Third, it is hypothe-
sized that the Oklahoma appellate courts will have been 
reluctant to strike out on their own to apply Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection analysis as a means of re-
moving inequities in the state's law concerning child 
custody and financial support obligations. 
This chapter will first consider the development of 
federal equal protection doctrine in the United States 
Supreme Court. It then will analyze Oklahoma law from 
the constitutional perspective developed in the United 
States Supreme Court's gender-based classification cases. 
In the course of this analysis, the three hypotheses 
listed above will be examined. 
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B. The Development of Gender-
Based Equal Protection 
Analysis 
It took the United States Supreme Court almost a 
century to apply the guarantee of equal protection to 
victims of racial discrimination, and it is taking even 
longer for the Court to extend this same guarantee to 
victims of sex discrimination. Prevailing social atti-
tudes have generally been reflected by the Court with 
regard to the status of women and men in their political, 
economic, and social roles. 1 Generally, cases taken to 
the Supreme Court concern discrimination against women, 
and early decisions either avoided the discrimination 
issue or adopted a "protectionist" attitude to justify 
the discrimination. In the nineteenth century the Court 
upheld an Illinois statute which prohibited women from 
the practice of law, declaring, 
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, 
has always recognized a wide difference in 
the respective spheres and destinies of man 
and woman. Man is, or should be, woman's 
protector and defender. The nature and 
proper timidity and delicacy which belongs 
to the female sex evidently unfits it for 
many of the occupations of civil life. The 
constitution of the family organization, 
which is founded in divine ordinance, as 
well as in the nature of things, indicates 
the domestic sphere as that which properly 
belongs to the domain and function of 
womanhood.2 
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In the opinion of the Court written by Justice Samuel 
F. Miller, the gender-based discrimination issue was 
ignored, and thus Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 
131 (1873), held simply that the Fourteenth Amendment 
did not interfere with Illinois' authority to regulate 
admissions of members to its bar. 
The 1875 case of Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 
Wall.) 163 (1875), further suppor~ed the protectionist 
view of the Court by ruling that the Fourteenth Amendment 
did not compel the states to allow women the right to 
vote. Although women were citizens, the right to vote 
was not a privilege or immunity of national citizenship 
prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment nor 
was it added to the list after the passage of the Antend-
ment. It was not until 1920 that women were granted the 
franchise with the ratification of the Nineteenth 
Amendment. 
Even as late as 1961 in Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 
57 (1961), the Court was denying women equal protection 
of the law by reaffirming a position taken in Strauder v. 
West Virginia, 100 u.s. 303 (1880), providing for the 
exclusion of women from jury duty. This decision, 
however, was overturned in the 1975 decision of Taylor v. 
Lousiana, 419 u.s. 522 (1975). 
The United States Supreme Court continued with this 
view while hearing cases regarding working conditions 
67 
and laws intended to protect women's morals until 
the civil rights movement awakened a new view toward 
th f f d . . . t' 3 o er orms o 1scr1m1na 1on. It became rapidly 
clear that the Court's previous protectionist attitude 
contributed substantially to the discrimination that 
women felt working to support themselves and their 
families. Because women had been expected to stay at 
home, they were generally less well educated than men 
and as a result obtained lower paying, low skilled jobs 
where the opportunity for advancement was almost non-
existent. When women and men performed the same job 
function, women received less pay on the theory that a 
female's earnings were less vital to support of a family 
than were those of a man. Even Congress was ahead of 
the Court where equality between the sexes was at issue. 
In 1963 the Equal Pay Act added to the Fair Labor 
Standards Act the principle of equal pay for equal work 
regardless of sex, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex by 
employers, labor organizations, and employment agencies. 4 
It was not until the 1970's that cases of sex 
discrimination in various forms began to reach the 
Supreme Court based on the Fourteenth Amendment's equal 
protection clause. Early in the twentieth century, 
Justice Holmes referred to equal protection as "the 
5 
usual last resort of constitutional arguments." This 
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description of the "old" Fourteenth Amendment equal 
protection was probably well deserved. The elements of 
the "old" equal protection were satisfied if the classi-
fication in a statute was reasonably related to the 
legislative purpose. Under this rational basis test, 
a classification or distinction made in a legislative 
enactment was presumptively constitutional. The classi-
fication or distinction had only to be reasonable, 
nor arbitrary, and in some way rationally related to 
a valid public purpose. 6 If there was any reasonable 
justification for the legislative decision, it was 
upheld. Generally, the rational classification require-
ment was easily satisfied, and the statute and its 
sexual discrimination withstood the constitutional 
challenge. 
In the late 1960's and early 1970's the "new" 
equal protection began to emerge. Although it continued 
to apply the old rational basis test (minimal judicial 
scrutiny) to most of the legislation being challenged on 
equal protection grounds, in certain cases the Court 
developed and applied a newer, stricter standard for 
evaluating legislation. Such cases involved either 
"suspect classifications" or "fundamental interests." 7 
The Court requires the demonstration of a compelling 
state interest in order for such statutes to withstand 
an equal protection challenge. In effect, the statute 
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is presumed to be unconstitutional if these interests 
are present--completely reversing the situation under 
the rational basis test. This places a burden on the 
state or federal government which is extremely difficult 
to meet. Almost always the stricter standard of review 
is fatal to the challenged statute. The Warren Court's 
strict scrutiny generally asked whether the means were 
necessary and whether less drastic means were available 
to achieve the same (valid) legislative purpose. 
Strict scrutiny is applied to relatively few cases. 
Those classifications the Court has placed under this 
test are headed by classification or distinction based 
on race, which originally was the prime target of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 8 To classifications based on race, 
the Court later added illegitimacy9 and alienage. 10 
Justice Stone, in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 
304 U.S. 144 (1938), suggested that certain "discrete and 
insular minorities" might require greater judicial pro-
tection and that their situations might therefore "call 
f d . 1 h. . d. . 1 . . n 11 or a correspon 1ng y more searc 1ng JU 1c1a 1nqu1ry. 
Generally the classifications which have been subjected 
to such "more searching" inquiry have several common 
characteristics. First, these are immutable character-
istics over which the individual has no choice or control. 
Second, these characteristics are immediately identi-
fiable. Third, persons with these characteristics have 
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been the subject of historical patterns of discrimination 
and also have been underrepresented in the political 
process. Persons who possess these characteristics are 
of special interest to the Court which since at least 
the early 1940's has protected the minorities' interests 
in the democratic process, at first tentatively and then 
with more judicial vigor. 
The "new" equal protection has thus come to be known 
as "tier two" analysis. A law challenged under equal 
protection rationale is subjected either to the minimal 
level of scrutiny (rational basis, or "tier one" test) or 
or the more stringent strict scrutiny ("tier two"). If 
the tier one analysis is employed by the Court, the law 
is almost certain to be upheld, but if the justices shift 
to tier two analysis, the plaintiff is almost always 
assured of prevailing in the challenge against the law. 
Despite the fact that sex is an immutable character-
istic and immediately recognizable, and despite the long 
historical pattern of discriminatory treatment of women 
who were at the same time excluded from, or underrep-
resented in, the political process, classifications based 
on sex have not been termed "suspect" by either the 
Warren or Burger Courts. Since the 1970's the Court has 
been characterized by indecision and has been unable to 
determine just what standard of judicial scrutiny is to 
be applied to sex-based classifications. 
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The Burger Court has not consistently applied the 
two tier test (rational basis or strict scrutiny) , but 
according to some legal commentators it has developed a 
new middle standard of review with which to consider 
gender-based distinctions. 12 One commentator has 
described this newest standard as follows: 
The model suggested by the developments 
would view equal protection as a means-
focused, relatively narrow, preferred 
ground of decision in a broad range of 
cases. Stated most simply, it would have 
the Court take seriously a constitutional 
requirement that has never been formally 
abandoned: that legislative means must 
substantially further legislative ends 
• . . • The yardstick for the accept-
ability of the means would be the purposes 
chosen by the legislature, not "constitu-
tional" interests drawn from the value 
perceptions of the Justices.l3 
"Under this 'means focused' equal protection analysis, 
the Court has avoided expansion of scrict scrutiny," 
and at the same time it has also avoided the "noninter-
ventionist approach of the rational basis test." 14 
Professor Guenther has termed this phenomenon "minimum 
scrutiny with a bite."15 As Justice Brennan observed in 
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 511 (1975), a case 
involving the Court's interpretation of the Fifth Amend-
ment's due process clause for equal protection analysis 
purposes, 
While we have in the past exercised our 
imaginations to conceive of possible rational 
justifications . . . we have recently 
declined to manufacture justifications 
in order to save an apparently invalid 
statutory classification.l6 
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The confusion in the law on this point is evident when 
one considers that Justice Brennan is attempting to 
summarize the recent case law on the topic but finds 
himself in dissent in this particular case because of 
the delicate balance of power on the Court on the sex-
based classification cases. 
In order to understand gender-based statutes' 
treatment under the equal protection clause, an exami-
nation of some of the recent decisions is necessary. 
In Reed v. Reed, supra, the Court purported to apply the 
rationality test. The case involved the estate of a 
minor child who died intestate. His parents, who at the 
time were separated, each filed a petition to serve as 
the administrator of the child's estate. The father was 
appointed administrator in accordance with an Idaho 
statute that gave preference to males when a man and a 
woman were equally qualified to serve. The United States 
Supreme Court struck down the Idaho statute as a clear 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection 
clause. In applying the rational basis (tier one) test, 
Chief Justice B ger noted that the sex criterion was 
wholly unrelated to the objective of the statute and was 
an arbitrary legislative choice. 
To give mandatory preference to members 
of either sex over members of the other, 
merely to accomplish the elimination of 
hearings on the merits, is to make the 
very kind of arbitrary legislative choice 
forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment; and whatever 
may be said as to the positive values of 
avoiding intrafamily controversy, the 
choice in this context may not lawfully 
be mandated solely on the basis of sex.l7 
According to one legal commentator, the actual test 
employed was "tier one-and-a-half" as the legislation 
was neither subjected to strict scrutiny nor given 
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deferential treatment with a presumption of constitution-
l 't 18 a 1 y. 
Two years later in the case of Frontiero v. Richard-
~, 411 u.s. 677 (1973), the Court explicitly di:s.cussed 
whether sex was a suspect classification. The Court 
held unconstitutional a statutory scheme which allowed 
male members of the armed forces to claim wives as 
dependents without proof of dependency while at the same 
time requiring proof of dependency before male dependents 
could be claimed by women members of the armed services. 
With only Justice Rehnquist dissenting, the Court held 
that administrative convenience did not justify the 
gender-based classification. To this degree, the case 
did not move beyond the rationale of Reed v. Reed, supra, 
but four justices were willing to make a clear statement 
that "classifications based on sex, like classifications 
based upon race, alienage, or national origin are 
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inherently suspect" in the language of the plurality 
opinion of Justice Brennan. 19 In addition to Rehnquist, 
four other members of the Court rejected Brennan's 
attempt to move sex into the tier two analysis level. 
Justice Powell, in an opinion concurring in the judgment, 
was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun 
in citing the pending Equal Rights Amendment for not 
declaring sex a suspect classification. 
There is another, and I find compelling, 
reason for deferring a general categorizing 
of sex classifications as invoking the 
strictest test of judicial scrutiny. The 
Equal Rights Amendment, which if adopted 
will resolve the substance of this precise 
question, has been approved by the Congress 
and submitted for ratification by the States. 
If this Amendment is duly adopted, it will 
represent the will of the people accomplished 
in the manner prescribed by the Constitution. 
By acting prematurely and unnecessarily, as 
I view it, the Court has assumed a decisional 
responsibility at the very time when state 
legislatures, functioning within the tradi-
tional democratic process, are debating the 
proposed Amendment. It seems to me that this 
reaching out to pre-empt by judicial action 
a major political decision which is currently 
in process of resolution does not reflect 
appropriate respect for duly prescribed 
legislative processes.20 
In Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), and Geduldia 
v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), the Court appeared to 
alter course and sustained two statutes which embodied 
gender-based classifications. In Kahn, a Florida 
statute giving preferential tax treatment to widows over 
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over widowers was upheld. The Court accepted the state's 
claim that preferential treatment for women was needed 
because women faced more economic difficulties upon the 
death of a spouse than did men because men could more 
easily enter the job market. 
This case is not like Frontiero v. Richard-
son ... where the Government denied its 
female employees both substantive and pro-
cedural benefits granted males "solely ... 
for administrative convenience .... " We 
deal here with a state tax law reasonably 
designed to further the state policy of 
cushioning the financial impact of spousal 
loss upon the sex for which that loss 
imposes a disproportionately heave burden. 
We have long held that "[w]here taxation is 
concerned and no specific federal right, 
apart from equal protection, is imperilled, 
the States have large leeway in making 
classifications and drawing lines which in 
their judgment produce reasonable systems 
of taxation." Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore 
Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 •... A 
state tax is not arbitrary although it 
"discriminate[s] in favor of a certain 
class . . . if the discrimination is founded 
upon a reasonable distinction, or difference 
in state policy," not in conflict with the 
Federal Constitution.21 
In Geduldig, the Court upheld a state disability 
insurance program that excluded coverage of disabilities 
related to normal pregnancy and childbirth. The 
exclusion was challenged as a violation of the equal 
protection guarantee. The six-justice majority held that 
the exclusion was based on physical condition rather than 
sex. 
The lack of identity between the excluded 
disability and gender as such under this 
insurance program becomes clear upon the 
most cursory analysis. The program divides 
potential recipients into two groups--
pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. 
While the first group is exclusively 
female, the second includes members of 
both sexes. The fiscal and actuarial 
benefits of the program thus accrue to 
members of both sexes.22 
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Under this analysis by Justice Stewart's majority opinion, 
the question simply became one of whether the exclusion 
was reasonable. The state had a valid interest in main-
taining the self-financing nature of the program and 
sought to give the best quality coverage at as low a 
cost as possible rather than having lesser coverage over 
all risks at the same rate of contribution by the state 
employees. Because the statute did not make a gender-
based classification, according to the majority, only 
tier one analysis was required--and the statute was 
upheld. 
Not surprisingly, these opinions which upheld sex-
based classifications did not go unchallenged. Justice 
Brennan led three-justice dissents.in each case as he 
continued to assert his view that classification by sex 
deserved to be placed in the same suspect category as 
race, alienage, and national origin. 
In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 u.s. 636 (1975), 
the Court returned to the Frontiero side of the line by 
unanimously striking down a portion of the Social 
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Security Act. The provision struck down provided bene-
fits for mothers who survived their husbands but not 
for fathers who survived their wives. Justice Brennan 
held that the statute unjustifiably discriminated against 
female wage earners who paid Social Security taxes by 
affording their survivors less protection than those of 
males. To hold an opinion of the Court together in this 
case, however, Brennan was forced to abandon his crusade 
for suspect category status for gender-based classi-
fications. 
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 u.s. 7 (1975), saw the Court 
examine a Utah statute which established eighteen as the 
age of majority for females and twenty-one for males in 
a child-support setting where the divorce decree did not 
specify the ages for termination of child support obli-
gation. The father terminated support payments for the 
daughter when she reached eighteen but continued to pay 
for the son under the statutory obligation. The Utah 
Supreme Court upheld the statute under a rational basis 
analysis, but the United States Supreme Court reversed 
on the ground that such clear-cut sex discrimination 
could not withstand even this low level of analysis. A 
similar fate awaited Oklahoma's attempt to establish 
different ages for males and females for the legal 
purchase of 3.2 beer in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 
(1976). 
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In Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), the Court 
examined a sex-based alimony statute of Alabama, a state 
which lacks its own equal rights amendment. The plain-
tiff, ex-wife instituted contempt proceedings against her 
former husband alleging his failure to make alimony pay-
ments. The ex-husband asserted that the Alabama statute 
which required former husbands, but not former wives, to 
pay alimony was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. In the majority opinion, Justice Brennan 
emphasized that any "protectionist" statute must further 
the legislature's goal of bringing needy women to parity 
to pass Fourteenth Amendment equal protection analysis. 
This statute, however, did not accomplish that purpose 
since it applied to both wealthy women and needy women, 
and the legislative end could be furthered by case-by-
case judicial determinations. 
Under the statute, individualized hearings at 
which the parties' relative financial circum-
stances are considered already occur • . . . 
There is no reason, therefore, to use sex as 
a proxy for need. Needy males could be helped 
along with needy females with little if any 
additional burden on the State. In such cir-
cumstances, not even an administrative con-
venience rationale exists to justify operating 
by generalization or proxy. Similarly, since 
individualized hearings can determine which 
women were in fact discriminated against 
vis-a-vis their husbands, as well as which 
family units defied the stereotype and left 
the husband dependent on the wife, Alabama's 
alleged compensatory purpose may be effectu-
ated without placing burdens solely on 
husbands. Progress toward fulfilling such 
a purpose would not be hampered, and it would 
cost the State nothing more, if it were to 
treat men and women equally by making ali-
mony burdens independent of sex. "Thus, 
the gender-based distinction is gratuitous; 
without it, the statutory scheme would only 
provide benefits to those men who are in 
fact similarly situated to the women the 
statute aids." Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 
supra and the effort to help those 23 
women would not in any way be compromised. 
The Court reaffirmed its stand in Reed v. Reed, supra, 
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that ''the state's preference for an allocation of family 
responsibilities under which the wife plays a dependent 
role" is not a legitimate state goal justifying use of a 
sex-based classification. 24 
Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Company, 100 
S.Ct. 1540 (1980), was closely parallel to Frontiero, 
supra, when a provision of Missouri's workman's compen-
sation law denied a widower benefits in his wife's work-
related death unless he could prove dependence on his 
wife's earnings but did not require similar proof of a 
widow whose husband died a work-related death. The 
Court found this provision to be a violation of the 
equal protection clause in that it discriminated against 
both men and women. On the one hand, there was dis-
crimination against women in that their beneficiaries 
were treated differently from those of men (similar to 
the analysis in Weinberger, supra), and on the other it 
discriminated against men by imposing an additional 
burden of proof. The state's attempted generalization 
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that women were more likely to be dependent on their 
spouse did not justify the gender-based statute. The 
Court noted that the legislative end of providing for 
needy spouses was an important governmental objective, 
but it concluded that the method adopted by the Missouri 
legislature did not substantially relate to the achieve-
ment of these ends. The state's claim of administrative 
convenience failed, as had similar claims in prior cases. 
Thus, the tier one-and-a-half analysis that had emerged 
in earlier gender-based equal protection cases allowed 
the Court to strike down the law without having to 
declare such classifications "suspect" in Fourteenth 
Amendment terms. 
Likewise, in Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 101 S.Ct. 1195 
(1981) , the Court struck down a Louisiana statute which 
allowed a husband to unilaterally execute a mortgage on 
a home jointly owned with his wife when the state law 
did not provide the wife with the same authority. 
Speaking for the majority, Justice Marshall agreed with 
state's contention that the need to designate one of 
two spouses as the manager of community property was an 
important governmental interest. He disagreed, however, 
with the state's assertion that the automatic designation 
of the husband as the manager was substantially related 
to the achievement of the state's valid objective. 
In its most recent pronouncement on the issue of 
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Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and gender-based 
classification, the Court in Michael M. v. Superior Court 
of Sonoma County, 101 s.ct. 1200 (1981), upheld a Cali-
fornia statute which defined statutory rape in such a 
way that only men could be criminally liable under the 
statute. The Court affirmed the decision of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court; however, unlike the state court, 
the Court refused to apply the tier two, strict scrutiny 
analysis to the statute. Upon review, the Court found 
that the statute withstood analysis under the tier one-
and-a-half approach. The legislative objective of 
reduction in the number of teenage pregnancies was 
indeed found to be an important governmental interest. 
The Court ruled the law was substantially related to the 
achievement of the objective and noted that a gender-
neutral statute might frustrate the state's purpose as 
violations would not be as likely to be reported if the 
victim was in a position to be subjected to prosecution 
under the statute. The Court, however, was unable to 
reach agreement on a single opinion. The argument set 
forth above is taken from Justice Rehnquist's plurality. 
opinion. Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment and 
wrote an opinion based on what appeared to be a rational 
basis test approach to the facts. Justice Stewart saw 
fit to write a brief concurring opinion in addition to 
joining Rehnquist's opinion in which he noted that in 
the area of teenage pregnancies, at least, males and 
females simply were not similarly situated in terms of 
the risks involved. 
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An attempt to summarize the case law developed by 
the United States Supreme Court since Reed v. Reed, 
supra, must include the following points: (1) the Court 
has been unwilling to advance gender-based classification 
to the suspect category previously established for race, 
alienage, and national origin; (2) it is no longer 
willing, however, to approach gender-based classification 
from the mere rational basis apprOach of tier one 
analysis; (3) there is a division among the justices as 
to the correct approach to adopt in these cases in 
Fourteenth Amendment doctrine at the state level and 
Fifth Amendment doctrine at the national level; and (4) 
something of a compromise approach has emerged in which 
a tier one-and-a-half test is employed by which a law 
which classifies individuals on the basis of gender must 
substantially further an otherwise valid governmental 
policy goal. 
C. An Equal Protection Analysis 
of Oklahoma Child Custody and 
Support Law 
Since the 1970's sex discrimination has been 
subjected to varying degrees of judicial scrutiny under 
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the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. 
Therefore it is not surprising (especially after the 
Supreme Court's decision in Orr v. Orr, supra) that 
statutes concerning family and marital law that classify 
on the basis of gender are being challenged on this basis. 
Thus a statute which creates a presumption that, all other 
things being equal, the mother should be preferred over 
the father as the legal custodian of a young child may be 
attacked as being in violation of constitutional equal 
protection. 
In Gordon v. Gordon, 577 P.2d 1271 (Okla. 1978), 
Okla. Stat. tit. 30, § 11 withstood an equal protection 
attack when the matter was heard by the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court. Before an examination of the statute under the 
various levels of judicial scrutiny required under equal 
protection analysis is undertaken, a brief review of 
Oklahoma's child custody law is necessary. 
At the beginning of this study it was hypothesized 
that Oklahoma would not be in the lead among states in 
terms of adopting alternatives to the traditional sole 
maternal custody award discussed in Chapter II. On its 
face, the statutory language confirms the hypothesis. 
§ 11. Rules for appointment. In awarding the 
custody of a minor, or in appointing a general 
guardian, the court or judge is to be guided 
by the following considerations: 
1. By what appears to be for the best interests 
of the child in respect to its temporal and its 
mental and moral welfare; and if the child 
be of sufficient age to form an intelligent 
preference, the court or judge may consider 
that preference in determining the question. 
2. As between parents adversely claiming the 
custody or guardianship, neither parent is 
entitled to it as of right, but, other things 
being equal, if the child be of tender years, 
it should be given to the mother; if it be of 
an age to require education and preparation 
for labor or business, then to the father. 
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The statute emphasizes that the best interests of a child 
with respect to its moral and temporal welfare are 
important considerations in making such a determination. 
The statute also indicates that when parents dispute 
custody and all other factors are equal, a child of 
tender years should be given to the mother (although 
neither parent is entitled to custody as a matter of 
legal right). If, however, the child is of an age which 
requires education and preparation for business, the 
father should be awarded custody. Given the maternal 
preference built into the tender years doctrine in the 
law of American jurisdictions, the statutory attempt to 
prohibit automatic legal rights to custody may almost be 
negated in the same section of the statute. 
While the Oklahoma statute itself certainly does 
nothing to place the state in the forefront of develop-
ments in the law of child custody by way of alternatives 
to the traditional sole custody award, analysis cannot 
stop at this point. The first hypothesis could still be 
negated by creative judicial interpretation of the 
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statute or by Oklahoma common law. 
In child custody cases the Oklahoma appellate courts 
have repeatedly emphasized the importance of the "best 
interests" concept as the paramount concern with the 
determination of which parent should be entitled to 
custody is secondary. The right of either parent to the 
custody of a minor child has been viewed as being subject 
to the court's perception of the child's welfare. 25 
The problem with the Oklahoma courts' strong 
adherence to the "best interests" language combined with 
the statutory preference for the mother when the child is 
of tender years is that the best interest of the child 
and the preference for the mother are seen as synonymous. 
Two cases make this point with striking clarity. In 
Hunt v. Hunt, 315 P.2d 957 (Okla. 1957), a case involving 
a boy who was eight years old, it was stated that: 
It is generally recognized that the mother 
is a natural custodian of her child of tender 
years, and that if she is a fit and proper 
person other things being equal, she should 
be given custody in order that the child may 
receive the attention, care, supervision, and 
kindly advice, which arises from a mother's 
love and devotion, for which no substitute 
has ever been found.26 
Similarly, in Bruce v. Bruce, 141 Okla. 160, 285 P. 30 
(1930), the following language appeared: 
... [c]ourts know that mother love is a 
dominant trait in the heart of a mother, even 
in the weakest of women. It is of divine 
origin, and in nearly all cases far exceeds 
and surpasses the parental affection of the 
father. Every just man recognizes the fact 
that minor children need the constant be-
stowal of the mother's care and love. It 
is for these reasons courts are loath to 
deprive the mother of the care and custody 
of her children, and will not do so, as 
above remarked, unless it clearly appears 
that she is an improper person to be en-
trusted with their care and custody.27 
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Bruce placed mother love nothing short of being divine, 
and the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Gordon v. Gordon, 
supra, furthered the adherence to the maternal preference 
doctrine by noting the biological differences between the 
sexes and declaring mothers to be the favored custodians 
28 over fathers when all things were equal. It is 
apparent that the Oklahoma appellate courts still cling 
to these antiquated and unproven theories despite current 
literature which recognizes established associational 
29 
ties as essential prerequisites for realistic love. 
Awarding custody on the basis of an arbitrary doctrine 
which is based on an anachronistic doctrine not founded 
on empirically based theory surely inhibits inquiry into 
the best interests of the child. Casting further doubt 
on unstable ideas is the increasing trend in some juris-
dictions that the best interests of the child may not 
lie with the mother's sole custody and consequent award 
of joint custody. 
The Oklahoma courts also have tended to ignore the 
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equal footing language of the statute with regard to 
neither parent having a right over the other concerning 
custody. In order for the father to obtain custody, he 
must show that awarding custody to the mother would 
actually work to the detriment of the child. See Irwin 
v. Irwin, 416 P.2d 852 (Okla. 1966). The mother's 
position becomes superior to that of the father, and he 
must prove other things are not equal by showing the 
mother's unfitness or incompetence. This places an 
unfair burden on the father. Proving a mother's unfit-
ness is extremely difficult and often results in bitter 
court proceedings. The hostility engendered by these 
proceedings may work against, rather than foster, the 
best interests of the child. 30 
Oklahoma's courts give little help as to what 
evidence determines unfitness. In Waller v. Waller, 
439 P.2d 952 (Okla. 1968), the court's language is 
vague and states that 
before a mother is deprived of the custody 
of her children of tender years, it must 
clearly appear that she is an im~roper 
person to be entrusted with it.3 
To say the least, this attempt at clarification of the 
standard was less than successful. 
In Roemer v. Roemer, 373 P.2d 55 (Okla. 1962), the 
father presented undisputed psychiatric testimony that 
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he was a proper person to care for, nurture, and love 
his son. Testimony also indicated that the mother 
appeared to be rejecting the child. The mother, how-
ever, was not characterized as a moral degenerate, and 
the court awarded her custody of the child. It is 
obvious that courts which fail.to include relevant 
facutal, medical, and psychological evaluations in their 
deliberations place an onerous burder on the father 
seeking custody. 
Perhaps a minor departure from the established 
pattern may be perceived in Park v. Park, 610 P.2d 826 
(Okla. Ct. App. 1980), in which Judge Brightmire, writing 
for Division Two of the Oklahoma Court of Appeals, sus-
tained a trial court's award of custody to the father of 
two boys, ages five and eight, both of whom were in 
school. In his opinion, Judge Brightmire attempted to 
play down the importance of the "tender years" doctrine. 
But even though the supreme court has applied 
the "tender years" integrant a time or two, it 
has not yet rej:ected the last clause of the 
statute specifying that the child be given to 
the father once it advances beyond the "tender 
years" plateau--a vague and indistinct age 
level • • . • And so the result is that 
even if the "tender years" rule is applicable, 
the trial court was justified in awarding 
custody to the plaintiff since there was 
sufficient eveidence that the children were 
not of "tender years," other things [were not] 
..• equal," the boys were both of an age 
to require education, and that the youngsters 
were better off living with their father than 
with their mother.32 
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Because of the last portion of the above quotation, how-
ever, this case cannot be taken as a drastic departure 
from established law. The Court of Appeals specifically 
notes that things were not otherwise "equal," and it 
in general defers to the discretionary award of custody 
by the trial court. As will be noted later in this 
chapter, such deference to trial courts in custody cases 
is sufficiently strong to require at least an inference 
that is it the deference, rather than a conscious shift 
in judicial policy, which explains the decision in this 
case. 
From this brief survey of the leading cases on 
child custody law in Oklahoma, it is apparent that the 
case law of the state has not moved in the direction of 
reform mandated by the Supreme Court's interpretation of 
the statute or by its own creation of policy through the 
decisional process. The Supreme Court has not been 
overtly hostile to trial court experimentation in 
occasional cases, however, so long as it has been satis-
.fied that the "best interests of the child" have been 
the primary concern of the trial court in arriving at 
some form of custody other than sole maternal custody. 
While such cases appear to be unusual from the reported 
opinions of the appellate courts, at least two can be 
found. Gilbert v. Gilbert, 460 P.2d 929 (Okla. 1969}, 
and Conrad v. Conrad, 443 P.2d 110 (Okla. 1968), 
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demonstrate approval of arrangements under which the 
childr~n spend the school year with one parent and 
vacations with the other. When, however, the appellate 
courts face a situation in which the logistical problems 
of joint custody become burdensome on the child--such as 
in a week-by-week basis--the sole custody preference 
again asserts itself, as in Rice v. Rice, 603 P.2d 1125 
(Okla. 1979). In this case, the award of sole custody 
was to the father, but it involved conduct on the part 
of the mother which supported the finding that the 
child's best interests would be furthered by paternal 
custody. In the opinion, it should be noted, the Supreme 
Court held that the inconvenience of the week-by-week 
joint custody arrangement was by itself sufficient reason 
to set aside the dual custody provisions of the original 
decree. 
In view of this analysis of the Oklahoma decisional 
law, the cases tend to confirm the first hypothesis. 
Oklahoma has not taken the lead in departing from the 
traditional sole maternal custody award to experiment 
with alternatives. 
The second hypothesis examined was that the Oklahoma 
courts are reluctant to intervene to overturn child 
custody and support decisions rendered by the trial 
courts of the state. In a line of cases reaching as far 
back as Gilcrease v. Gilcr~~se, 176 Okla. 237, 54 P.2d 
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1056 (1936), the Oklahoma Supreme Court has taken a 
strong position against interference with trial court 
discretion unless the trial judge's ruling was contrary 
to the clear weight of the evidence. Cases specifically 
relating to child custody and support include Cordilla 
v. Taylor, 181 Okla. 20, 72 P.2d 375 (1937); Scott v. 
Scott, 203 Okla. 60, 218 P.2d 373 (1950); Tschauner v. 
Tschauner, 206 Okla. 586, 245 P.2d 448 (1952); West v. 
West, 268 P.2d 250 (Okla. 1954); Smith v. Smith, 396 P.2d 
1016 (Okla. 1964); and Duncan v. Duncan, 449 P.2d 267 
(Okla. 1969). A recent statement by the Court of Appeals 
confirms that this is still the dominant doctrine in the 
law of Oklahoma. In Rice v. Rice, supra, it was held 
that, 
The best interest of the child is the para-
mount consideration of the trial court, and 
where it does not appear the court has abused 
its dis~3etion it will not be reversed on 
appeal. 
So long and clear a line of cases makes it evident that 
in Oklahoma the trial court's discretion will be given 
great deference on appeal. There is little, if any, 
indication of a willingness on the part of the appellate 
courts to intervene to impose their policy preferences 
over those embodied in the trial court decisions, and 
thus the second hypothesis also tends to be confirmed. 
The developments over the decade since the United 
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States Supreme Court's decision in Reed v. -Reed, supra, 
have perhaps made it inevitable that equal protection 
challenges against the Oklahoma law of child custody 
and support would be mounted. The third hypothesis to 
be tested in this study is that the Oklahoma appellate 
courts will have been reluctant to strike out on their 
own to apply Fourteenth Amendment equal protection 
analysis as a means of removing inequities in the state's 
law concerning child custody and financial support 
obligations. 
The majority of decisions handed down by the United 
States Supreme Court which have found laws discriminattng 
on the basis of sex unconstitutional have focused on 
discrimination against women. Discrimination on the 
basis of gender as a denial of equal protection can 
apply equally well to men, however. 
Oklahoma's child custody and support laws are 
discriminatory against both men and women. The statute 
undeniably treats men and women differently. While the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court in Gordon v. Gordon, supra, 
found that Okla. Stat. tit. 30, § 11 as it contains the 
"tender years" presumption withstood an equal protection 
review under any level of judicial scrutiny. The Court 
suggested the custodial preference embodied in the 
statute represents an instance "where the sex-centered 
generalization actually [comports] to fact," using 
language taken from the opinion of the United States 
Supreme Court in Craig v. Boren, supra. 
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While the majority of Oklahoma's highest court may 
have taken this position in terms of equal protection 
analysis, this study will attempt to show that a more 
careful analysis of the three levels of scrutiny does 
not support the ruling in Gordon, supra. 
Even under minimal judicial scrutiny, the "tender 
years" doctrine would not pass constitutional muster. 
Certainly the legislature is attempting to advance a 
valid governmental interest in seeking to provide for 
the welfare of children of divorced families, and this 
is emphasized in Okla. Stat. tit. 30, § 11 through the 
adoption of the "best interest" as well as the mental 
and temporal welfare wording. There is, however, a 
complete absence of rationality between the maternal 
preference or "tender years" doctrine and the purpose 
of the legislature. The Court is completely ignoring 
current studies which indicate "mothering" to be an 
aspect of "parenting" rather than a matter of biological 
necessity which only the mother can fulfill. The old 
axioms of mothers being "natural" guardians and more 
suited to the special responsibility of child rearing 
furthers outmoded stereotypes. The mechanical preference 
bears no rational relationship to the goal of furthering 
the "best interests" of the child, and it may in fact 
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actually work against the child's interests if by its 
application a court avoids careful consideration of the 
relative merits of both parents as potential custodians 
of the child. 
If the tier-two, strict scrutiny analysis were to 
be applied to the "tender years" preference embodied in 
Oklahoma law, there is little doubt that the Fourteenth 
Amendment's equal protection clause would be sufficient 
to invalidate the preference. While the state might be 
able to assert that there is a "compelling interest" in 
protecting the welfare of the child, it would be hard 
pressed to demonstrate that there are no less drastic 
means to accomplish the valid legislative ends. It is 
difficult to conceive of more drastic means short of 
an iron-clad statutory preference for maternal preference 
to deny the father custody of the minor children, and 
the state could just as well achieve its valid goal by 
a case-by-case evaluation of the relative merits of the 
two parents. Certainly under a strict-scrutiny analysis, 
a compulsory presumption could not be justified by any 
claim to administrative convenience. 
While the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Gordon v. Gordon, 
supra, indicated that the current state-law doctrine 
could withstand any level of equal protection analysis, 
and while it can be argued that this is an erroneous 
conclusion on both tier one and tier two, the most likely 
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basis for a successful attack on the statute in federal 
court would come under tier one-and-a-half which requires 
the state to demonstrate that the means adopted substan-
tially further the valid legislative purpose (in this 
instance, protection of the welfare of the child). 
Even if the state were successful in convincing the 
court that there was some rational basis for the statu-
tory preference (contrary to the assertion above that 
not even this is accurate in light of the romantic view 
of "mother love" embodied in the law), more would be 
required to withstand the more careful scrutiny required 
by tier one-and-a-half. It should be remembered that 
hearings on child custody are already a fact of life in 
Oklahoma divorce law and that either parent may challenge 
the other's fitness to be awarded custody, even though 
the "tender years" doctrine provides a clear statutory 
preference for the mother if all other things are equal. 
This situation is closely analagous to that in Orr v. 
Orr, supra, which struck down one-way awards of alimony 
under the Alabama statute. Recalling Justice Brennan's 
language in that case, 
Under the statute, individualized hearings 
. . . already occur . . . . There is no 
reason, therefore to use sex as a proxy for 
need. 34 
The identical argument can be made with regard to 
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child custody decisions. Individualized hearings 
already take place, and sex is not a constitutionally 
suitable substitute for careful judicial weighing of the 
evidence before making a ruling on the merits of the 
respective claims advanced by the parents. 
Even as the "tender years" doctrine embodied in the 
Oklahoma statute and case law is discriminatory against 
men, the clause relating to children of an age requiring 
education and preparation for business discriminates 
against women. The law presumes, again with all other 
factors being "equal," that the father is better suited 
to be custodian at this point in the child's development. 
To rely upon such a presumption in light of recent 
developments which have seen more and more women move 
into the business and professional worlds is just as 
offensive to equal protection of the laws as is the 
"tender years" doctrine. It also originated in the 
stereotype of women being suited only for remaining at 
home in the "domestic sphere." 35 Again, such statutory 
presumptions are no substitute for individualized 
hearings on the merits. 
Turning to child support obligations in Oklahoma, 
Okla. Stat. tit. 10, § 4, imposes the primary respon-
sibility for child support on the father. The mother 
bears only a secondary responsibility. Even if a 
divorce decree has given sole custody to the mother, 
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the father remains obligated to provide primary support. 
This is true even in face of the statutory language which 
provides, 
The parent entitled to the custody of a child 
must give him support and education suitable 
to his circumstances. If the support and 
education which the father of a legitimate 
child is able to give are inqdequate, the 
mother must assist him to the extent of her 
ability. 
In Lairmore v. Lairmore, 617 P.2d 892 (Okla. 1980), the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court simply ruled that this statute 
was not applicable to child support proceedings arising 
out of divorce actions insofar as it imposed the support 
obligation on the custodial parent. Thus, the father 
continued to be primarily responsible for the financial 
support of his children even after divorce. 
Two cases, however, have indicated that the Okla-
homa appellate courts are willing to allow trial courts 
to inquire into the ex-wife's financial condition when 
determining the level of the support obligation to be 
imposed on the father. West v. West, supra, included 
the ex-wife's property and her financial capacity as 
factors to be considered in the support judgment, and 
Walsh v. Walsh, 460 P.2d 122 (Okla. 1969), upheld a 
trial court's reduction of support payments when the 
financial status of the ex-wife was substantially 
enhanced by an inheritance. 
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Even though these two cases permit trial court 
analysis of the mother's financial status, they do not 
require such examination. The constitutional issue 
presented by the Oklahoma support obligation's auto-
matically being placed on the father again is one of 
equal protection and the use of sex as a proxy for a 
reasoned factual determination. Orr v. Orr, supra, is 
even more closely in point when it comes to the support 
obligation. Just as in an alimony award, the support 
obligation requires an assessment of the financial status 
of the father, and it would .not be burdensome to require 
a similar investigation of the mother's financial 
condition. 
Whether the constitutional analysis presented here 
in terms of tier-one-and-a-half ultimately prevails in 
federal court challenges to Oklahoma child custody and 
support laws will by necessity be a question to be 
settled in the future. The discussion of the Oklahoma 
cases, however, indicates that the third hypothesis is 
confirmed. Oklahoma certainly has not taken the 
initiative in applying Fourteenth Amendment equal 
protection analysis to the state's child custody and 
support law. If anything, the Gordon case, supra, 
simply brushed past the issue with a mere assertion that 
the law of the state could withstand any type of equal 
protection analysis (without any reasoned support). 
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The Oklahoma Supreme Court's summary rejection of 
the equal protection argument did not go unchallenged, 
however. In Boyle v. Boyle, 615 P.2d 301 (Okla. 1980), 
Justices Hodges, Doolin, and Opala rejected the majority 
contention that the Oklahoma custody statute is not a 
gender-based discrimination statute. 
The trend in legislation, legal commentary, 
and judicial decisions is to abandon fixed 
rigidity of the tender years presumption in 
favor of a flexible and unbiased consideration 
based solely on the best interest of the 
children coupled with an analysis of the 
individual characteristics, qualifications, 
and relationships of the involved parents 
and children. 
The gender preference rule is sexually 
discriminatory on its face and discriminatory 
as applied by the courts. It is unconstitu-
tional as a denial of equal protection to 
both sexes. Although Gordon found the 
statute to be constitutional under any 
standard of review, in actuality, it denies 
equal protection under every standard. The 
statute is arbitrary, and under enlightened 
psychological and pragmatic considerations 
not only does it bear no rational relation-
ship to the objective it seeks to accomplish, 
it also fails to withstand the test of 
strict scrutiny.36 
Because of the 6-3 vote in Boyle v. Boyle, however, 
the position advanced in the above quotation is a 
distinctly minority view in the Oklahoma appellate 
courts, and the Boyle case stands as the most recent 




It was not until the 1970's that the United States 
Supreme Court made progress with regard to the elimi-
nation of lawsin the United States which unconstitu-
tionally discriminated on the basis of sex under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Beginning with Reed v. Reed, 
supra, the Court began to examine statutes based on 
gender classification in a different light than previous 
discrimination claims. While whe Court was not, and 
still is not, ready to give these classifications the 
most severe judicial scrutiny which is accorded to 
classifications based on race, illegitimacy, and 
alienage, it has afforded a higher standard of review 
than the mere "tier one" minimum scrutiny test. This 
new tier one-and-a-half standard is a mixture of tier 
one and tier two elements which requires the gender-
based classification to substantially further a legis-
lative goal. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that statutes 
concerning family and marital law that classify on the 
basis of gender are being challenged under the Four-
teenth Amendment's equal protection clause. 
With regard to the Oklahoma law concerning both 
child custody and the support obligation, three 
hypotheses were presented and examined. It was first 
hypothesized that Oklahoma is not in the lead among 
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states in adopting alternatives to the traditional sole 
maternal custody award. Okla. Stat. tit. 30, § 11 on 
its face gives preference to one sex over the other and 
case law also establishes the fact that Oklahoma courts 
disapprove of, and are hesitant to grant, a custody 
award which differs from the sole maternal custody award. 
While there have been a few recent exceptions (particu-
larly by one judge), these cases contain language that 
indicates the decision was based on the "inequality" of 
the parties and not on an attempt to bring about an 
abrupt change in judicial policy. 
The second hypothesis, that appellate courts are 
reluctant to intervene and overturn trial court decisions 
on custody awards and support payments was confirmed by 
a solid line of cases. Without exception, case law 
takes the position that absent a ruling which cannot be 
supported by the evidence, given due deference to the 
trial judge, the appellate courts will not intervene. 
The third and final hypothesis was that Oklahoma 
appellate courts have been reluctant to strike out on 
their own and apply Fourteenth Amendment equal protection 
analysis to correct inequalities in the state's law re-
garding child support and custody. The Oklahoma Supreme 
Court in Gordon v. Gordon, supra, summarily rejected any 
argument that the "tender years" doctrine was unconsti-
tutional under the Fourteenth Amendment's equal 
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protection clause. The decision met with a good deal 
o.f disapproval from legal commentators and from three 
Supreme Court justices in a later case. The discrimi-
natory language against females with regard to the 
custody award when children reach the age for education 
and preparation for business, and the support obligation 
which places the primary obligation on the father with 
only secondary liability on the mother, are still await-
ing authoritative appellate interpretation in the state 
courts under equal protection analysis. 
In general, it appears that dissent is growing but 
that Oklahoma custody and child support laws are still 
discriminatory on their face and as applied when con-
sidered in light of the decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court since Reed v. Reed, supra. By no means 
can it be argued that the Oklahoma appellate courts have 
moved forward on their own to apply Fourteenth Amendment 
equal protection analysis to gender-based classifications 
in the state's law of child custody and support. The 
analysis of the case law presented in this chapter con-
firms the third hypothesis. 
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CHAPTER IV 
REFORHS 
Child custody and support laws have been enacted in 
every state to protect minor children. Unfortunately, 
however, those laws generally have been ineffective and 
discriminatory. Oklahoma has been no exception to this 
rule rule. 
Okla. Stat. tit. 30, § 11 which provides the rules 
to be applied in custody awards is arbitrary and 
confusing. Too many "tests" which have been, and still 
are, commonly employed render the statute almost meaning-
less as a guide to the court. The "best interest" test 
·which is found to be the paramount concern or test is 
accompanied by the "tender years" doctrine which may call 
for a diametrically opposed pattern of reasoning. The 
statute is contradictory in that its language provides 
that neither parent is entitled to the child as a matter 
of right but with another clause providing that when 
all other things are equal, the mother is entitled to 
a child of tender years. If, however, the child is of 
an age to require education and preparation for business 
then the father should be entitled to custody. These 
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presumptions hardly put each parent on an equal footing 
with the other parent. The discrimination of the 
statute on its face as it applies to each parent is 
dependent upon the age of the child; however, as sole 
maternal custody is the traditional award, it is arguable 
that even when the child is past "tender years" (whenever 
that may be) the father will not receive custody anyway. 
In determining an award of custody of a child the 
proper relationship of the child, the parents, and the 
state must be recognized and maintained. The objective 
and the "test" employed should be that which is in the 
best interest of the child. The rights of both parents 
should be equal and superior to those of the state or 
any other person. The rights of the parents as well as 
the "best interest" of the child should be considered. 
Obviously, according to the literature, children 
are better off if the parents can agree to share child-
rearing responsibilities and physical custody. Even if 
parents cannot agree, the children's need for love and 
influence from both parents does not disappear in face 
of the parents' inability to agree. Therefore, it can 
be justifiable to award joint custody (if it is found 
not to inhibit the best interests of the child). The 
lead of some courts in promoting joint custody through 
awards of it even when the parents cannot agree should 
be followed. 
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For these reasons, it is suggested that joint 
custody be the statutory preference and awarded unless 
there is clear evidence that it would not be in the 
best interests of the child to do so. The determination 
of the appropriateness of joint custody would be the 
task of the trial court judge. The most important 
factors of a joint custody determination should be 
worked out by the parents and presented to the court for 
approval. Dealing with unresolved details (particularly 
logistics) should be handled in a manner similar to 
that currently used for visitation. The decree should 
require "reasonable" actions on the part of both parents 
but leave the details in their hands absent a showing of 
abuse on the part of one parent or the other. 
For those problems which present themselves at a 
later time, and on which the parents cannot agree, the 
custody decree would provide that these shall be 
determined by the court. Family conciliatory counseling 
should be provided within the judicial system at all 
stages of the process, whether at the time of the 
initial decree or at some later stage involving modifi-
cation of the court's original order. 
While the literature suggests that joint custody 
actually decreases the need for further adjudication, 
in some cases there may actually be an increase in 
the rate of returning to court. If so, the potential 
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benefits to the concerned families (parents and children 
alike) should offset the increased quantity of litigation 
by an improved quality of the custody arrangement. 
A proposed statute which would accomplish many of 
these goals was drafted by Taussig and Carpenter. 1 While 
it may not be the perfect solution, it certainly is 
superior to the Oklahoma statutory and case law in that 
the "best interests" of the child and parents are to 
be considered, there is no gender-based constitutionally 
suspect classification system, and joint custody is made 
the presumed norm rather than a novel exception in child 
custody awards. The language of this proposed statute 
may be found in Appendix A. 
When joint custody cannot be awarded because of 
circumstances which are demonstrated by clear evidence 
to make such an award contrary to the best interests of 
the child, sole custody may be the only alternative. 
In this instance, however, there is no place for gender-
based preference. Sex cannot be used as a proxy for 
a careful weighing of all the facts, including the 
conduct of the parents toward the child and their inter-
action as it affects the child. As the United States 
Supreme Court noted in Orr v. Orr, ~upra, detailed 
hearings already are a fact of life in these matters. 
The time has come to remove sexual stereotypes from the 
law of custody. The parents' respective claims to 
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custody over their child or children deserve more than 
a reflex based on tradition which in turn is based on 
a view of men and women as suited only for mutually 
exclusive roles in life. 
Just as Oklahoma custody doctrine is outmoded and 
discriminatory, especially in light of recent social 
science findings, so are the support obligation aspects 
of the law of the state. The imposition of primary 
liability on the father perpetuates a double standard 
which might have been justified at one point in history 
but is no longer consistent with the facts. The 
financial responsibilities of a family are increasingly 
borne by men and women alike. 
While women's earnings are still less than those 
of men when considered as a whole, these conditions are 
becoming more equalized. The present situation certainly 
warrants replacement of the double standard in child 
support with a case-by-case analysis of individual 
circumstances and an equitable apportionment of the 
support obligation. One way to accomplish the legitimate 
goal of supporting the child without relying on a sex-
based stereotype would be to make use of a pro rata 
contribution by each parent based on earning capacity. 
As was the case with custody, such an approach is 
constitutionally preferable to a legal obligation on the 
part of either parent which may not be consistent with 
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the facts in any particular divorce situation. 
Given the demonstrated reluctance of the Oklahoma 
appellate courts to take steps on their own to implement 
a more equitable standard in child custody and support 
obligation cases, the model statute provided in Appendix 
A together with similar legislation dealing with the 
support obligation may well be the best way to deal with 
the problem in Oklahoma. Such reform is long overdue, 
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In cases of dissolution of marriage where are 
minor children, the trial court shall, unless it find 
that it would be detrimental to the child, award the 
right to make child-rearing decisions jointly to both 
parents. 
The specific arrangement of the joint custody shall 
be by arrangement of the parties which the court shall 
accept and approve unless it finds that the agreement of 
the parties is unconscionable. A lack of agreement 
between the parents may be taken into account by the 
court in deciding whether to award joint child-rearing 
rights. Aspects not agreed upon by the parties shall be 
decided by the court. 
In determining the unresolved details where joint 
custody is awarded, whether to award joint custody, and 
the arrangement and details of custody and visitation 
the court on hearing shall determine the matters con-
sistent with the best interests of the child, parents, 
and societyj in that order. The court shall consider 
all relevant factors; the wishes of the child's parents 
as to his custody; the wishes of the child as to his 
custodian; the interaction and inter-relationship of 
the child with his parents, his siblings, and any other 
person who may significantly affect the child's best 
interests; the child's adjustment to his horne, school, 
and community; and the court shall not consider conduct 
of a proposed custodian that does not affect his 
relationship to the child. 
In cases where the parents have joint custody, 
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they shall collectively determine the child's upbringing, 
including his education, health care, and religious 
training, subject to court supervision with power of 
modification. 
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